Friedrich Hebbel's Conception of Movement in the Absolute and in History by Flygt, Sten G.

Friedrich Hebbel’s Conception of Movement in the 
Absolute and in History
From 1949 to 2004, UNC Press and the UNC Department of Germanic 
& Slavic Languages and Literatures published the UNC Studies 
in the Germanic Languages and Literatures series. Monographs, 
anthologies, and critical editions in the series covered an array of 
topics including medieval and modern literature, theater, linguistics, 
philology, onomastics, and the history of ideas. Through the generous 
support of the National Endowment for the Humanities and the 
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, books in the series have been reissued 
in new paperback and open access digital editions. For a complete list 
of books visit www.uncpress.org.
ImUNCI COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literatures 
Friedrich Hebbel’s Conception of 
Movement in the Absolute and in 
History
sten g. flygt
UNC Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures
Number 7
Copyright © 1952
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons cc by-nc-nd 
license. To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.
org/licenses.
Suggested citation: Flygt, Sten. Friedrich Hebbel’s Conception of Move-
ment in the Absolute and in History. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1952. doi: https://doi.org/ 10.5149/9781469657516_
Flygt
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Flygt, Sten G.
Title: Friedrich Hebbel’s conception of movement in the absolute and
in history / by Sten G. Flygt.
Other titles: University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic
Languages and Literatures ; no. 7.
Description: Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, [1952]
Series: University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic 
Languages and Literatures. | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: lccn 53000919 | isbn 978-1-4696-5750-9 (pbk: alk. paper)
| isbn 978-1-4696-5751-6 (ebook)
Subjects: Hebbel, Friedrich, 1813-1863.
Classification: lcc pd25 .n6 no. 7

TO 
T. MOODY CAMPBELL 
Teacher and Friend 

PREFACE 
The following study was begun in order to find an answer 
to the question: Do Friedrich Hebbel's plays exhibit a progressive 
or conservative tendency? As so often happens, the attempt to 
work out a convincing answer led to the conclusion that the ques-
tion was incorrectly put, for the notion of a progressive or a static 
norm of social and historical change turns out to be subordinate, 
almost incidental, to what I have come to feel is the essential ques-
tion: What was Hebbel's conception of movement in the Absolute 
and in history? After the exposition and analysis of the first two 
parts of this study an attempt is made to answer the re-phrased 
question. I believe that whatever merit the answer has lies in its 
suggestiveness and that its defect stems from the limitations of 
conceptual discourse when used as an instrument of understand-
ing something that lies on a non-conceptual level. 
The first part of the study does something that should have 
been done long ago: it offers a comprehensive discussion of the 
passages in the diaries and letters, with some reference to the 
poems, which express or reflect Hebbel's thoughts about social 
and historical progress. It has, of course, been pointed out that 
Hebbel was not consistent in his views of this question, but there 
has been a strong tendency, especially on the part of those stu"'. 
dents of Hebbel who find in all his plays a turning point which 
marks the beginning of a higher type of society, to ignore the 
inconsistency and overlook its significance. In the following pages 
the inconsistency is shown to be fundamental and persistent, re-
vealing itself in an oscillation between periods of ''progressivism" 
and periods of "conservatism" in Hebbel's life. 
The second section is given over to a discussion of the dramas 
apart from the diaries and letters, partially in order not to dilute 
the evidence which is collected and presented in the first part, and 
partially to disclose more deftly the threads of internal relation-
ship passing from play to play. The analysis of the plays, of 
course, cannot pretend to be completely new and different. In-
deed, such a pretense would challenge disbelief. But the analysis 
does show that there exists in Hebbel's dramatic production the 
same kind of oscillation as was established for the diaries and let-
ters, and it is believed that Parts One and Two of the study, when 
taken together, will make quite clear the inadequacy of any 
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"Wendepunkt-Theorie." The third part then ventures to suggest 
that it is not the direction but the nature of the movement in the 
Absolute and in history which is the basic question for Hebbel. 
It is hoped that the analyses and conclusions of the present study 
will make some positive contribution to the discussion of what 
is still a rather controversial issue in Hebbel-scholarship. 
Middletown, Conn. 
February 6, 1952 
S.G.F. 
PART ONE 
Discursive Formulations: The Diaries and Letters 

PART ONE 
DISCURSIVE FORMULATIONS: THE DIARIES 
AND LETTERS 
" ..• und wenn man den Shakespeare einmal zum Zeugen fiir die Nich-
tigkeit des Lebens aufruft und nicht hinzufiigt, dass er an einem andern 
Ort mit gleichem Ernst von dem hohen und einzigen Wert des Lebens 
redet, so siindigt man gegen ihn .... " Hebbel, Tagebiicher, 19.Dez.1843. 
It becomes abundantly clear after only a superficial considera-
tion that Hebbel's universe is in constant flux; Panta rhei is for 
him a fixed principle that governs the mystic processes of the 
cosmos as well as the struggle of nations and men. This much 
can be said with certainty at the outset. 
It is not at all certain, however, that Hebbel can with justice 
be made out a champion of social progress, a Hegelian who con-
ceived of the death of an Agnes Bernauer as helping by a process 
of metaphysical dialectic to make a class intermarriage possible 
for memoers of subsequent generations.1 
In fact, as has been noted,2 there seems to have been a great 
deal of inconsistency in Hebbel's beliefs about whether or not 
life progresses because of the conflict between the individual 
and the Absolute. Indeed, painstaking examination of Hebbel's 
diaries, letters and poems will not only reveal inconsistency in 
this regard, but shows that there was in Hebbel's feeling and 
thinking on this point a kind of alternation between periods of 
time in which he tended to be progressive and others in which 
he tended to be conservative. And it is possible even to make 
a correlation, though necessarily a rather vague one because of 
the lag which is natural between a spiritual reorientation and its 
expression in a major work, between a generally progressive or 
generally conservative mental set as revealed in poems, letters, 
and diaries, and the various plays. 
Although the idea of progress is frequently taken to mean 
change for the better in the status or condition of a social group, 
it does not require much reflection to realize that a consideration 
of the progress of an individual is a more simple and perhaps even 
primary aspect of the whole question. Thus in our study of pro-
gressivism and conservatism in Friedrich Hebbel it will be 
necessary to examine how he regarded the universal process of 
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change and flux as affecting not only a state, a social class, but 
also a single human being. 
When, therefore, the poems, letters, diaries, are examined 
with a view toward learning how Hebbel expressed his thoughts 
and feelings about the question of change and flux, whether for 
society or for the individual, it is revealed that in his earliest 
period, as is natural at an age of extreme youth, he was inclined 
to a rather naive faith in progress. This early phase of naive 
progressivism runs to about the end of 1838, but, of course, it 
must be borne in mind that for a matter as gradual as a shift 
in general outlook it is not appropriate to attempt to fix any kind 
of clear cut terminus either ante quem or post quem. 
The earliest significant utterance would seem to be four lines 
of verse3 from his eighteenth year to the effect that many a 
transformation is not necessarily a metamorphosis into a higher 
form, as of caterpillar into butterfly, but that the opposite change, 
of butterfly into caterpillar, also takes place. Thus the key-note 
of ambivalence is struck at the outset and the problematic anti-
thesis is stated at once. Two years later in a rather long rhymed 
reflection4 on his relation to nature, he expresses the feeling of 
a vital human nisus towards the godhead. And it is much the 
same feeling that is expressed in a poem called "Rosenleben,"5 an 
impetuous urge to advance to highest perfection, but it is tempered 
by the solemn realization that the individual must perish. And 
even in this earliest stage a note of conservatism is struck in a 
verse plea to spare an old house for reason of sentiment. 6 
Conservative sentiment, however, is overshadowed by defiant 
egotism. It is against a background of penury, disillusionment 
with friends and benefactors in Hamburg and a desperate strug-
gle to acquire skill and information so readily mastered by his 
fellow students in Heidelberg and Munich, none of whom could 
match him in decisiveness, maturity, and penetration, that a letter 
to Elise Lensing7 must be read. He tells her that if she has 
the feeling that he is somewhat set apart and above others, she 
should also realize that in a difference between himself and the 
world he may be right even though the world is at least not wrong. 
To be sure, Welt in this passage is probably not to be taken in 
too metaphysical a sense, none the less it is interesting to note the 
passage as an expression of Hebbel's feeling, however transient, 
that the individual may be justified in opposing society: a pro-
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gressive and perhaps revolutionary point of view. An even more 
naive progressivism is expressed in a letter to Emil Rousseau,8 
in which he assigns to the poet the task of illuminating the criti-
cal relations of the individual and the Absolute or, to anticipate 
his later terminology, Idea. In this connection he believes that he 
can detect progress in the great representatives of literature, 
Dante being more comprehensive than Homer, Goethe more 
translucent than Shakespeare. The same kind of naive progres-
sivism is expressed in another letter to Rousseau,9 in which he 
speaks of a feeling of revulsion that everything, no matter how 
splendid, must give way to something still more splendid. In a 
different mood, however, he goes so far as to see a proof for the 
existence of God in the upward movement of nature towards a 
culmination: since man feels that he is not this culmination, it 
must exist outside him in a higher being, or God.10 
Until the end of the year 1838 Hebbel's reflections on progress 
continue in this same vein: the best thing about religion is that 
it produces heretics ;11 the individual will not die as long as he 
possesses the capacity for growth ;12 th• principle of evil is un-
stable, changing ultimately into good ;13 one should never give 
up the resolution to change, even after change has become impos-
sible.14 On the twenty-eighth of November, however, he made an 
entry in his diary which two years later he was to call the most 
profound observation in the whole book,15 that man is the continu-
ance of the act of creation, which prevents the world from coming 
to a halt, growing rigid and petrified. In the present context this 
observation seems to fit in with the generally progressive outlook 
that has been apparent thus far, but it is significant that on the 
same day there is another entry16 in the diaries to the effect that 
it is scarcely a comfort that we are constantly ascending, since we 
will always remain on the ladder. This observation rather modifies 
the force of the one immediately preceding, which is, indeed, one 
of the most profound entries in all the diaries, half revealing, 
half concealing Hebbel's primal poetic-religious experience. 
The strain of conservatism which was glimpsed in the early 
verses is present also in the diaries and letters, less prominent 
at first than the progressive strain but attaining very definite 
expression in November, 1838, shortly after the death of his 
mother and of his dearest friend, Emil Rousseau. Its earliest ex-
pression in the diaries comes in 1835,17 as the tragic or perhaps 
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cynical feeling that it is the lot of the unusual individual to be 
destroyed: it is an old story that flints must be broken to pieces if 
they are to give off sparks. This, too, is a revealing statement, 
which hints at Hebbel's concept of tragic experience for the in-
dividual, his mystic belief that individuation is a sin against the 
Absolute which must be expiated by re-absorption of the in-
dividual into the Whole. It is a belief which obviously cannot be 
called progressive and optimistic as far as the individual is con-
cerned, and yet cannot be put on the conservative side because it 
may be interpreted, and those critics who take Hebbel's basic 
position to involve a belief in social progress do so interpret it, as 
meaning that the individual must perish in order that society or 
humanity may advance. Since this is in a sense the crux of the 
problem of progressivism and conservatism in Hebbel, this, and 
all similar expressions of belief in the tragic insignificance of the 
individual in relation to the Idea, must be put down in a class by 
themselves. Moreover, what is true for the individual may also 
be true for the human race: the world fS a unique residue after 
God's self-purification, the constantly collapsing bridge from na-
ture to God, the end of the convulsive struggle is exhaustion and 
the only hope is for the total extinction of life ;18 the individual 
stands in the same relationship to nature as a variation to a 
musical theme, and God can enjoy a blissful self-subsistence with-
out humanity to be nurtured and cared for. 19 Thus man, both 
collectively and individually, is of no moment to the Deity, though 
he may be used by the Deity for the attainment of some great 
purpose, by being flung beneath the wheels, to impede for a mo-
ment, or change, the course of the great cosmic juggernaut. A 
tragedy based on the story of Jeanne d' Arc would thus have to 
produce the impression of affording a glimpse into the eternal 
order of nature which not even the Deity can disturb with im-
punity.20 A purpose for which it is conceivable that the Deity 
would disturb the eternal order of nature would be the elevation 
of humanity, but the masses make no progress, we read else-
where in the diaries.21 And a bit later the doubts about the pos-
sibility of progress find such expressions as these: Mankind 
holds on to every error that might help it; it would believe in 
immortality even though having knowledge of the contrary; it 
could be that the higher life produces nothing more than a cozy 
web of useful illusions, though that would, to be sure, be so extra-
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ordinary that a creature capable of having such wise and divine 
dreams, might deserve and even effect their realization.22 Ger-
mination and corruption are not far removed from each other and 
usually identical.23 
There now ensues a long period in Hebbel's development in 
which neither a progressive nor a conservittive outlook seems to 
predominate. It is a period of sharp and irregular fluctuation be-
tween the two points of view. It runs roughly from the end of 
1838, when he faced the necessity of soon leaving Munich for 
Hamburg, to approximately the fall of 1846 after his marriage 
to Christine Enghaus. It is the period in which Judith, Genoveva, 
Der Diamant, and Maria Magdalene were written, Moloch and 
Julia begun. It is a second period of expansion and emergence 
from the narrow circle of Hamburg to which he returned on foot 
in the late winter of 1839 and where he was tormented by his 
equivocal relationship with Elise Lensing. It was an emergence 
made possible by the travel stipend granted him early in 1842 by 
Christian VIII of Denmark which took him to Paris, Rome, Na-
ples, and Vienna, and brought him into contact with people of 
social, intellectual, and artistic distinction. The period culminates 
in a rather decided turn towards progressivism.24 
Let us survey first the utterances from the diaries, letters, 
and poems of this period wbich are concerned primarily with the 
process of change or flux and then, as before, consider those which 
are concerned with the helpless plight of man in opposition to the 
Absolute or are unequivocally conservative. 
It now becomes more apparent than before that although Heb-
bel was convinced of the actuality of change and flux in the uni-
verse and in society, he was by no means convinced that the 
process of change was in the direction of some better condition, 
either for mankind or the individual. The process of change 
might be merely a re-formation of the same substance: the sun 
shines bright; it melts the icicles along the roof. they drip down 
merrily in order to turn into ice again below.25 On the other hand, 
he can also write of the possibility of change for the better in the 
individual, it being the province of art to show this life process, 
by which man's inmost being evolves, the good evoking the bad and 
this in turn the better, and so on without limit.26 A little more 
than a year later, after the completion of Judith, he writes in a 
letter to the actress Auguste Stich-Crelinger, which, as he fre-
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quently did, he incorporated in the diaries/7 that Judith is based 
upon a conception that in extraordinary crises of world history 
the Deity intervenes directly in the course of events and causes 
monstrous deeds to be done by people who would certainly do no 
such thing of their own volition. This was the case with Judit}J., 
who was compelled to murder Holofernes when he was about to 
destroy the Chosen People from whom salvation was to come. 
Other entries in the diaries for the same month agree with this 
progressive, teleological concept of history. He wonders whether 
the chronicle of great attainments is good for mankind, which 
must be paralyzed by the awareness of unsurpassable greatness, 
and so, if the vital spring of creativity is not to be choked by the 
accumulations of the past, Shakespeare, Goethe, all giants must 
be swept away, a terrible and insupportable thought.28 Life is an 
unceasing process of becoming; to regard oneself as having come 
to the end of this process is to put an end to one's life.29 A little 
. later, however, he regards the life process very differently: 
Neither fixity nor progress, only movement is the purpose of 
life,30 a direct contradiction of the evolutionary concept of history 
which he embodied in Judith and which was supported by his 
study of Jeanne d' Arc, whom he seems to have regarded as a 
parallel to Judith: God had to perform a miracle to maintain the 
independence of France, because it was from France that the 
revolution was to proceed.31 But whether or not progress takes 
place, whether there is revolution or evolution, the highest law 
of life for both states and individuals is the law of self-mainte-
nance. If the old form has strength enough to resist the new, then 
it is certain that the new form does not yet have strength enough 
to unite all the elements which must be united after the destruc-
tion of the old.32 The law of self-maintenance operates with brutal 
disregard of personal feelings and morality; it visits murder and 
torment upon the free rebellious spirits whom its own repressive 
laws have called into being. So runs a sonnet33 dated the third 
of September 1841. Yet, we are told in another sonnet34 dated 
only two days later, the history of the world tries to fashion out 
of fragile material a pure image of humanity, which we can 
glimpse only when the shrouding mist is lifted momentarily; in 
our limited vision we reverence the mere fragments which are 
chipped off the block from which the image is being fashioned, 
and which can ultimately be completed; then in the presence of its 
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perfect totality the imperfect individual will pass away. A third 
sonnet35 written at the same time recommends that the poet, 
whose task it is to mirror the struggle between old and new, have 
reverence for the forms of life which emerge too late. This ad-
monition is very interesting, inasmuch as it was Hebbel's view 
that all poetry is dramatic, that is, progressively productive, and 
that an idea which does not generate a series of new ideas is 
unpoetic, for life is revealed only in the form of transition.36 In-
deed transition is the highest law of life,37 which can exist only 
through a pendulum-like alternation between poles. And the most 
beautiful symbol of life is the fly which perishes in copulation: 
all its I existence is only a preparation for the highest moment 
which is also the moment of dissolution, in which the spark is 
transmitted to a new being-an endless chain which always leads 
to the climax and never beyond it. 38 
Eighteen forty-three, the year of Maria Magdalene, is a year 
in which the pertinent diary entries revolve about the nature of 
vital and historical change. As we have seen above, the highest 
law of life is transition, but it is at least possible that life can 
be manifested only in a rising and falling line, that sin is a 
necessary consequence of goodness, because goodness cannot be 
maintained at a peak and cannot go beyond it and so on.39 In a 
letter to Eduard Duller he takes a more positive view, saying that 
Duller, like himself, has been compelled to descend into regions 
where ordinary eyes perceive only the terror of decay and not the 
germs of new Iife.40 Then the notion of the pendulum-movement 
of history recurs: all movement in history is a gradual transi-
tion from one extreme to another and back rather than a recon-
ciliation of extremes.41 In literature, specifically the drama, he 
hopes to see real progress: Shakespeare must be surpassed by a 
new form of the drama in which not merely the critical relation 
of the individual to the Idea, but the justification of the Idea 
itself is to be debated.42 This passage, of course, is related to the 
problem which he posed in Maria Magdalene, about which he 
wrote to Elise Lensing :43 all the characters are justified and yet 
the collision of these opposing natures sets a terrible destiny 
into motion; in the background are ideas of family, morality, and 
honor which will be universally accepted possibly only after cen-
turies. The collision of opposing natures in a way mirrors the 
pendulum-movement of history: the poet will express his ideas 
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dialectically in the same way that the world and life are dialectic-
and every phenomenon evokes its opposite.44 
As has already been noted on p. 3 above, on the twenty-eighth 
of November 1838, Hebbel made an entry in his diaries which two 
years later he called the most profound observation in the entire, 
book : the existence of man brings life and movement into the 
world, which would otherwise be rigid. The logical consequence of 
this is that the necessary condition for historical or social change, 
whether this change be progressive or merely oscillatory, is a. 
conflict between the eternal rigidity of the Absolute and the tran--
sient mobility of the individual. Hebbel was quite right in his 
judgment that the observation cited was the most profound in his 
entire book. Some notion of the full significance, it is hoped, will 
be revealed by the present study, especially the concluding section. 
Special mention is made of it here because in the spring of 1844. 
Hebbel made two significant and related entries in his diary: 
What is rationally good for the individual may be the most ir-
rational thing for the universe. What could be more rational for 
the individual than to wish for eternal youth, in which all his 
powers of development and effectiveness are at their maximum? 
And yet what is more irrational for the universe?45 
Thus the first entry. The second makes it clear why this must, 
be so: 
At the moment when the elixir of eternal life is discovered, 
human beings will no longer be abile to reproduce themselves-the 
well-spring will run dry. There will be no further death, but also 
no further birth,46 
Thus it is apparent that the individual must be sacrificed in. 
order that the Absolute may live and move. 
From this point in Hebbel's development until the end of the 
period we are now considering he fluctuates very strongly, al-
most rhythmically, between an evolutionary and a pessimistic· 
view of cosmic and historical change. The evolutionary or opti-
mistic view finds such expression as the elegiac couplets en- -
titled "Verschiedener Casus"47 which proclaim (ironically to. 
modern ears) that there need be no fear that the Russians will 
conquer Germany as the Germans conquered Rome, until the Rus-
sians have improved upon Tasso or the Germans upon the knout, 
or those entitled "Jetziger Standpunkt der Geschichte :',,,48 "What: 
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has history achieved so far? The eternal ideas ! Now the task of 
history is to realize them." Or, again, he speaks49 of the process 
of refinement as the highest principle of nature both in the 
physical and mental realm: from rock to plant, from plant to 
animal, from animal to man, and in man to genius. In sharp 
contrast is this pessimistic view of change: "Death! The constant 
succession of generations on the same level, the last being no 
more than the first!" 50 Yet he feels that even though it is a seri-
ous error on Hegel's part to suppose that art can be surpassed, 
there can be an ultimate and supreme stage of art.51 Then the 
idea recurs that life and movement are purchased only by the 
sacrifice of the individual: No human being can be born unless 
another dies just before.52 And thus, more than a year later, an 
interesting side light on his conception of production and change 
in nature :53 It is very probable that nature must create every-
thing that it can create, but also that a crisis will occur, as soon 
as nature might be able to do no more than repeat itself in order 
not to stop producing. Then he adds: "I am almost convinced of 
this." The creation of life he conceives of as occurring at the point 
where all limits cross and all contradictions touch each other.54 
The process of constant and violent fluctuation we have just 
touched in the period under consideration seems to have come to 
an at least temporary halt with the attainment of an optimistic 
view. On the sixth of October 1846, he recorded in his diary55 
that he is firmly convinced that some day the world will attain a 
form corresponding to what the noblest members of the human 
race think and feel; however, even then, bestial and diabolical 
creatures will not vanish but will only be bound. 
So much for the utterances which are concerned primarily 
with change and progress in this period of fluctuation. The im-
pression gained from them is strengthened if we briefly consider 
also the utterances from the same period which deal with the 
hopeless plight of the individual or have an outright conservative 
tendency. 
Most of Hebbel's speculations about the relation of the indi-
vidual to the Absolute are pessimistic as regards the individual, 
that is, for the individual the cosmic process ends in defeat, 
usually even without the consolation of being ennobled or elevated 
in any way, and it is only the nonentity who can escape this tragic 
fate.56 Sometimes, however, Hebbel does seem to have at least the 
HEBBEL'S CONCEPTION OF MOVEMENT 
hope that the individual will reach a higher form through the 
tragic experience.57 But usually he feels that, even though the in-
dividual may be dedicated to the service of a divine purpose, as 
represented in Judith, none the less the individual is necessarily 
sinful by virtue of being an individual and thus cannot avoid 
tragedy. 58 All life is a struggle of the individual with the Ab-
solute. 5u It is a struggle which an individual of any dimensions 
cannot escape and in which sin against the Absolute is implicit. 
In a passage which is very important for his conception of tragic 
guilt, Hebbel writes: God will not attach decisive significance 
to the sins of sinful individuals against each other but only to the 
sins against the Idea itself, and there actual and only possible sins 
are completely identical.60 Man's freedom of will consists merely 
in his freedom to acquiesce to the inevitable. 61 The evidence is thus 
for the most part clearly against the supposition that Hebbel be-
lieved in the possibility of progress for the individual during this 
period. 
If we now search for utterances during the same period which 
are conservative in their tendency, that is, show a static concep-
tion of history, or the conception that historical change is merely 
an oscillation between extremes, or express the view that progress 
is illusory, or that it may even be desirable to resist change, it is 
possible to find a good many in addition to the ones already men-
tioned in connection with the discussion of the fluctuation in 
Hebbel's conception of historical change or transition. 
Attention has been called, on p. 3, to the very significant idea 
that the individual is the principle of mobility in the Absolute, 
which but for this would be lifeless and rigid. This idea is to be 
connected with the diary entry of the twenty-fourth of Feb-
ruary 183962 to the effect that there can be nothing completely 
new in the world, nothing which has not already been in existence: 
it is only that an element disappears at one place and reappears 
at another. The disappearance and reappearance of the elements 
must under this view constitute historical change, which a pro-
gressivist or surely a revolutionary would not only welcome but 
even assist. A thoroughly consistent progressivist would not say, 
as Hebbel does in one place :63 "Whoever directs humanity back 
within its boundaries, does a much more meritorious deed than 
one who supports it in its striving towards the infinite." Indeed, 
the striving of mankind towards the infinite may be a completely 
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illusory idea and Herder's notion of the perfectibility of humanity 
is contrary to history and also unreasonable, because the human 
race consists of transient individuals, who would endure great 
injustice if the twelfth millennium realized things which the 
sixth had rejected as mere dreams.64 
The other entries and observations which belong in the present 
category add nothing new or significant to what we already 
know : the cosmic process is symbolized in the two buckets in a 
well ;65 the world is a constantly renewed digestive tract through 
which the same old material passes ;66 the constant repetition of 
the same things must produce a sense of disgust with life ;67 his-
tory is merely an oscillating movement ;68 everything is from the 
beginning-nothing becomes, it merely changes forrn. 69 It can all 
be summed up by the diary entry from October 1844 (p. 9) to the 
effect that the generations of mankind merely succeed but never 
surpass each other. 
In the fall of 1846, as will be recalled, Hebbel seems to have 
arrived at a much more optimistic view, an attitude of political 
progressivism, which seems to have predominated in his outlook 
until the spring, roughly March, of 1848 when it was succeeded 
by another short period during which progressivism and con-
servatism were approximately equally balanced. The period of 
progressivism, corning shortly after his marriage to Christine 
Enghaus, is the period of Ein Trauerspiel in Sizilien, of the com-
pletion of Julia, and the beginning of Herodes und Mariamne, 
which was completed during the subsequent transition to the 
final period of conservatism. The period of political progres-
sivism which we are about to discuss was a period of political 
unrest in Europe culminating in the democratic revolutionary 
movements of 1848, which, it may be noted here, had a sobering 
rather than exhilarating effect on Hebbel. 
The reasons why it is possible, though perhaps a bit incau-
tious, to speak of a period of political progressivism between the 
latter part of 1846 and the early part of 1848 is that, beginning 
with the diary entry of the sixth of October 1846, which, as we 
have already noted, speaks of Hebbel's firm conviction that man-
kind is making progress towards a social paradise, most of the 
few expressions bearing on the subject express the same attitude. 
He writes in his diary on the eighth of January 184770 that he ex-
plained to Prechtler, though actually for his own benefit, that 
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the problem of conflict between the existing form of the state 
and the significant individual who has progressed beyond the 
state is to be solved by the growing realization on the part of the 
individual of a higher form of the state. Still, at another time in 
the same month71 he speaks of the tragic hero, i.e., the individual, 
as being in the same relation to the Idea as a disease is to the or-
ganism. And at still another time72 he writes of his doubts about 
the possibility of there being a history of the human race at all, 
in the sense that it would be possible to speak of an advance of the 
Weltgeist in knowledge of itself; these are doubts which, to be 
sure, are not for daily use, but as a remedy for a surfeit of Herder-
Hegelian constructs of the so-called world historical process. It is 
interesting that these skeptical reservations are written as though 
they were really no more than just that, and as if his basic con-
victions are actually in agreement with Herder's and Hegel's 
optimistic idealism. In accordance with this, his first comments 
upon the revolutionary movements of 1848 are affirmative, even 
enthusiastic. To Ludwig Gurlitt he writes :73 "What do you say 
about France? For Germany and all Europe I expect the most 
salutary results from this event which has happened with such 
surprising rapidity. But it is easy to prophesy, since the results 
are already becoming manifest everywhere!" Indeed, this en-
thusiasm went so far as to cause him to project a play about an 
appropriate political subject, Das erste Todesurteil. As we learn 
from his diary74 the impulse for the play came from a sense of ex-
hilaration at living in a new Austria in which he felt more secure 
than Prince Metternich, in which there were to be freedom of the 
press, national armament, and a constitution. This drama, which 
he conceived immediately after reading the emperor's last pro-
clamation, was to have the following outline: a monarch is con-
vinced by a serious miscarriage of justice caused by his minister 
not only of his own inadequacy as an absolute ruler, but also of 
human inadequacy in general, and determines to institute con-
stitutional government, freedom of the press, and so on. Heb-
bel's enthusiasm was not long unqualified. Only ten days latern 
he was much sobered by the attempt at bloody repression of the 
demonstrations in Berlin: he was oppressed by the thought of the 
suffering that confronted his own time and could rejoice only 
when he thought of future generations. His misgivings continued 
to increase even though the new political liberalization brought 
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him personal gains : his dramas could now be performed in the 
Hofburgtheater in Vienna. Still, he did not feel he was enough 
of a child to be happy about this turn of events: he didn't like 
the taste of the egg that had been roasted in the world conflagra-
tion.76 
His misgivings grew as time went on, but for a while, until 
about the middle of 1851, they seem to have been approximately 
balanced by continued hope and belief in political progress. The 
misgivings seem to have stemmed both from a growing insight 
into the brutality of revolutionary movements and from a disil-
lusionment: war is the liberty of certain barbarians, therefore, it 
is no wonder that they love it ;77 communism can triumph momen-
tarily, that is, can maintain itself until it has revealed all its ter-
rors and saturated humanity with loathing that will be sufficient 
for all time ;78 half a victory of the idea is worse than a total 
defeat.79 Still, both for the individual and for a whole nation, 
there may come a moment of time in which it can sit in judgment 
upon itself, when it has the occasion to repair the past and cast 
off old sins. At such times, Nemesis will be standing by, how-
ever, and woe to both nation and individual if it takes the wrong 
road. This, of course, is the situation of Herodes, in H erodes und 
Mariamne, but it is also the situation of Germany in 1848.80 
Hebbel continues to hope that the revolutionary movements ac-
tually will repair the past and at times thinks he sees signs that 
the social conflicts which he illuminated in his dramas are being 
debated in the streets and reaching an actual solution, so that his 
drama will no longer have to concern itself with negative critic-
isms of crumbling social conditions.81 Maria Magdalenie, of course, 
was the drama which was concerned directly with criticism of 
contemporary social conditions. Now he expresses the hope that 
Julia, the, so to speak, second and positive half of Maria Magda-
lene, will be more apposite to the times.82 
The hope that the revolutionary movements would actually 
repair the past was one that he expressed more confidently to 
others than to himself. Indeed, if violent fluctuation of attitude 
toward the question of social progress were not the rule in Hebbel, 
as we have seen it is, it would be very hard to believe that within 
four days of his writing to Gustav Kuhne in an optimistic vein 
about the positive solution of social conflict, he should enter in 
his diary an observation of profound conservatism. 88 It is, in 
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fact, a statement of the idea, which, changed very slightly in the 
outward aspect of the metaphor, illuminates the significance of 
Gyges und sein Ring in Kandaules' famous speech about the sleep 
of the world. In his diary Hebbel writes: 
They are now tearing up the paving of the state and society. 
I have a strange feeling about it. I feel as though the structure 
which is being destroyed now were built upon primal experiences 
made under conditions such as are becoming actual again, as though 
every paving block bore on its reverse side the inscription: We 
too know that this is a paving block, even though we have carved 
the image of a god upon it; it will be your task to see how you 
will get along without paving blocks that people take to be more than 
paving blocks! 
In Kandaules' speech, of course, the essentially worthless objects 
which have a right to veneration are the veil, the crown, and the 
sword, which Kandaules had felt blocked the road to progress, but 
which, as he came to understand, are a source of strength to 
mankind. 
On the last day of December 1848, looking back over the 
eventful and turbulent year, the political changes which it had 
wrought and in which he had taken some part as a member of a 
delegation which had besought the emperor to return to Vienna 
from Innsbruck as a necessary step toward the restoration of 
peace and quiet, Hebbel wrote in his diary :84 "We will probably 
never succeed in erecting an imposing and well-based political 
structure. Still, it seems that absolutism has been swept aside 
and, I should hope, cannot return. And that, alone, is an immeasur-
able gain." From a letter to Gustav Kuhne written probably in 
1849,85 we learn that the well-based and imposing political struc-
ture that Hebbel would like to see can and should be only a ration-
al expansion of the old structure and that the foundations of soci-
ety should not be torn up. But this essentially conservative out-
look is balanced by expressions of a decidedly anti-conservative 
point of view: the illnesses which signify the course of humanity 
are called revolutions ;86 a real conservative may not even wash 
himself ;87 it is a great error to suppose that the earth can return 
to the old center of gravity which it has lost, as though it would 
ever have lost it, if there had been enough pull in it to paralyze 
the elements which were pushing ahead. 88 Thus, the optimistic 
progressivism we have seen is abruptly checked by the political 
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events of 1848, regains some force for a time and then sub-
sictes more and more as the conservative strain comes to the fore. 
Into this emergent phase of the final conservative period fall 
Hebbel's comedy, Der Rubin, and the completion of the second act 
of Moloch. 
rl'he next significant expression from the diaries and letters 
bearing upon the problem of progressivism and conservatism 
was written on the fourteenth of September 185189 and it is con-
servative in tone: No matter what one may believe about the re-
lationship of the new era to the old, it is certain that the new 
E:ra has been living on mere concepts, whereas the old era had an 
immeasurable and, to be sure, mystic background of ideas, as 
can be seen in the contrast of Catholicism and Protestantism, 
absolutism and constitutionalism. The Nachspiel zur Genoveva 
was completed on the twenty-first of January 1851. The work of 
writing Agnes Bernauer had begun on the twenty-second of Sep-
tember.90 It was completed on the twenty-fourth of December in 
the same year. Some time after the first of the year 1851, then, 
can be considered as the beginning of the last period in the history 
of Hebbel's orientation towards progressivism and conservatism. 
Its general tendency towards conservatism received an impetus 
from a disillusioned reaction to revolutionary excesses and was 
subject to certain deviations in the direction of progressivism, 
as must now, in view of the development of Hebbel's views up to 
this time, be considered inevitable. It is the period not only of the 
Nachspiel zur Genoveva and Agnes Bernauer, but also of Gyges 
und sein Ring, of Die Nibelungen, and of the unfinished Deme-
trius. It is the period in which Hebbel's fame was assured, in 
which he enjoyed the little domestic happiness that was granted 
him, in which he acquired a home of his own, moved in the highest 
social circles of Germany, received public honors. The sense of 
tradition, which had never been absent in Hebbel (he was well 
versed in the history of Schleswig-Holstein and pride in the deeds 
of his ancestral Dithmarschen was a strong component of his 
boyhood fantasy, finding such concrete expression as his poem, 
"Die Schlacht bei Hemmingstedt," published in 1833), came to the 
fore again, and with it the shift of interest in the story of Agnes 
Bernauer from the tragedy of beauty to the tragedy of politico-
metaphysical necessity. From this time on, Hebbel referred quite 
often to his Agnes Bernauer as evidence that he was not revolu-
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tionary in his political tendencies. He felt that he had never before 
so clearly perceived the relationship between the individual and 
the state and that surely the criticism could not be made of this 
play that it attacked social conventions and order.91 It does, he 
feels, demonstrate that the individual, no matter how splendid, 
great, beautiful, or noble it may be, must under all circumstances, 
submit to society because, in society and in its necessary formal 
expression, the state, all mankind is embodied, but in the individ-
ual only a single aspect of humanity is revealed. This, he main-
tains, is the basic position of all his plays.92 
As Hebbel looked back, in December 1851, over the year just 
ended, he thought that the world situation had gained some sta-
bility and that a period was about to begin in which the opposing 
forces could, on the basis of the experiences they had had, work 
toward a lasting reconciliation. This was his pious wish for the 
future. 93 He was, therefore, profoundly shocked at the perform-
ance of a play called Otto von Wittelsbach when someone called 
out Da capo! after the scene in which the emperor was assassi-
nated. Such brutality and stupidity he considered the most shock-
ing thing he had ever heard, ample justification, not only for 
strict censorship, but even for closing the theaters.94 Hebbel 
seems now convinced of the fact that, as his Agnes Bernauer 
teaches, respect is due to the eternal institutions of the world,911 
and even when he professes to be convinced that the world will 
fight its way through to purer and higher forms, he declares that 
the unfolding of the entire man, which is the goal of social pro-
gress, must be based upon reverence.96 The capacity to feel this 
kind of reverence for representatives of the collective forces 
(e.g., the state) he feels has been to a large degree lost by the 
people of his time, so that even the wife of a prominent diplomat 
in Vienna was not able to sympathize with the last scene of Agnes 
Bernauer, even though Duke Ernst is without any question the 
fully justified representative of the collective forces.97 An at-
tempt on the life of the emperor evokes in him, together with gra-
titude for the fact that it was unsuccessful, a sense of shocked in-
dignation, since an unsuccessful attempt of this sort is worse than 
any other actual crime, hitting, as it does, at every individual 
through the representative of all. The fact that this view is not 
universally acknowledged he connects with the circumstance 
that a play like Agnes Bernauer can be rejected.98 Hebbel seems 
THE DIARIES AND LETTERS 17 
to have no doubt whatever that the state in a situation such as he 
portrayed in Agnes Bernauer has the right to demand the sacri-
fice of an individual life, no matter how innocent.99 He insists 
upon the fact that he is entirely on the side of Duke Ernst and 
maintains that it was the character of the duke that originally 
interested him in the subject (an assertion that we may well 
doubt in view of the evidence for Hebbel's early concern with 
the tragedy of beauty which has been presented by R. M. Werner, 
Meyer-Benfey and others). The necessity of putting Agnes to 
death, he says, springs from the fact that the rights of the in-
dividual count for nothing in a situation which endangers the 
foundations on which they rest.100 
From the passage just cited it can be seen that at least at 
the beginning of the last period of his life, the time during which 
he wrote both Agnes Bernauer and Gyges und sein Ring, his 
outlook was almost unequivocally conservative, for there is prac-
tically nothing from this period to redress the balance unless it 
is a brief passage from a letter to Adolph Pichler101 to the effect 
that the disease of self-destruction which has attacked the world 
is, after all, only the wholesome consequence of unhealthy condi-
tions. By 1856, however, after he had begun work on Die Nibe-
lungen, there is some relaxation of this uncomprising conserva-
tism and again we read in the diaries102 that the Absolute is indeed 
eternal but manifests itself only in transient phenomena, whose 
will to overprolong their existence constitutes the tragic curse. 
The transient phenomenal manifestations of the Absolute which 
outlive themselves, are, of course, not only individuals, but also 
social institutions. Ethical forees, Christianity, for example, 
which are manifest only in times of great change, are corrupted 
and perverted soon after their victory. This is a circumstance 
which Hebbel says he has always taken to prove that progress 
is possible only for the individual.103 This observation seems to 
take us back to his earlier remarks that the process of historical 
change consists only in an alternation of outward forms. The 
barbarian who destroys the forms of the civilization he attacks, 
the books and other works of art of that civilization, will neces-
sarily have to re-create those forms, if only after centuries.104 
The interest in the ebb and flow of history, in the alternation 
of forms, which comes to the fore again and modifies the very 
nearly reactionary outlook we have noted, Hebbel himself inter-
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prets conservatively. Contrasting himself with certain other men 
of letters, he writes to Uechtritz105 that the bizarre and violent 
aspects of his plays are due to the fact that he is concerned with 
the self-correction and revision of the world, the sudden and 
unforeseen delivery of the moral principle. In fact, Hebbel seems 
to fancy himself as a very moral writer and professes in a letter 
to Georg Cotta,106 which is written at least partly for effect, that 
to call him anything but unpretentious and conservative is a 
crude distortion of truth. The rather ironical tone of the letter, 
however, does not alter the fact that he was probably in earnest 
about calling Cotta's attention to the fact that the four plays 
which he had written since 1848 were anything but revolutionary: 
Herodes und Mariamne represents Christianity as the most 
elevated instrument of culture, Michel Angelo teaches deep humi-
lity, Agnes Bernauer shows the state to be the basic condition of 
all human prosperity which may demand any sacrifice, and 
Gyges und sein Ring celebrates the eternal rights of custom and 
tradition. 
There are only a few more passages to be cited on the pro-
gressive side of the account which we have been making of 
Hebbel's attitude toward the question of progressivism and con-
servatism, and these passages are not very progressive in tone. 
We read that the belief in God and immortality is the only thing 
which has made society and progress possible ;107 that all progress 
which the world has made has come about through great in-
dividuals who were a law unto themselves and broke with the 
established views and conditions; individuals are shadows of the 
species and, like them, fade away.108 Two diary entries, however, 
which belong under the general heading of change or flux must be 
emphasized in passing. They are variations of a feeling or belief 
that we have encountered before in substantially the same form. 
The earlier one reads: "You breathe in another's death as your 
life and another's life out as your death."109 The latter one, one 
of the last entries made, reads: 
If it ever should come to depend upon the will of any generation 
of the human race, whether it wished to live forever, but under the 
condition that no one else be either born or resurrected from the 
dead, might perhaps some minority, who would feel regret for the 
sake of Caesar and Alexander, Shakespeare and Goethe, Phidias 
and Raphael, and who would not wish to forfeit the geniuses of 
the future, reject this possibility, and could it accomplish 
anything?llO 
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The remaining passages to be entered on the cou~ !rvai:h,--e side 
of the ledger are also quickly summed up: In !Ht, as in every-
thing that is alive, there is no progress, only different kinds of 
stimulus.111 Since Hebbel rejects Herder's beli~f in the infinite 
perfectibility of the race and instead holds that nature reaches a 
high point only in the individual, he is not fanatical about the 
monarchical or republican forrr. cf government.112 Christianity is 
one of several mythologies and not necessarily the most pro-
found.113 
Hebbel's view of the individual, as the helpless pawn of vast 
forces, however, has not grown less poignant. It is his conclusion 
that where great catastrophes have come about, tney have re-
sulted not from the short-sightedness or wickedness of the per-
sons playing a 1~rominent role in history but through the action 
of some law.114 History is a mill in which the living believe they 
are toiling but in which phantoms perform the work.115 He cannot 
take a calm and dispassionate view of the cosmic tragic process, 
knows no consolation for the loss of the individual, even though 
it may only be a pet squirrel.116 The individual is doomed merely 
by virtue of being an individual, the passive perfect beauty of an 
Agnes Bernauer , :1n set off a tragic and deadly conflict.117 The 
helplessness of tl c. individual comes from the fact that it is his 
particular existen ~e which brings movement into the Absolute, 
is the necessary pre-condition of the cosmic process. As we have 
seen, Hebbel's views about the direction of the cosmic process are 
self-contradictory and fluctuate in small oscillations and large 
rhythmic movements embracing the oscillations much as a billow 
embraces wavelets. From first to last, however, he is consistent 
in his belief that the Absolute is prevented fr0m growing rigid 
only by the stream of individuals : there is no remedy for death 
and there can be none because nature has made the total life pro-
cess dependent upon the, so to speak, metabolic flow of individ-
uals, just as the individual life process is dependent upon the 
metabolic flow of basic substances.118 
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"Der Dualismus geht <lurch alle unsre Anschauungen und Gedan-
ken, <lurch jedes einzelne Moment unsres Seins hindurch, und er 
selbst ist unsre hochste, letzte !dee. Wir haben ganz und gar aus-
ser ihm keine Grund-Idee. Leben und Tod, Krankheit und Gesund-
heit, Zeit und Ewigkeit, wie Eins sich gegen das Andere abschat-
tet, konnen wir uns denken und vorstellen, aber nicht das, was als 
Gemeinsames, Losendes und Versohnendes hinter diesen gespal-
tenen Zweiheiten liegt." Hebbel, Tagebiicher, 2.Dez.1840. 
For Hebbel art was not only infinitely more than a projection 
of the world of phenomena, it was also something quite different, 
namely philosophy made actual, just as the world is the Idea 
(i.e. God or the Absolute) made actual.1 For him any philosophy 
which did not culminate and manifest itself in art and thereby 
give the highest proof of its reality need not concern itself with 
the world, since the world can attain totality only in art.2 It was, 
therefore, at least Hebbel's will to embody in his finished artistic 
creations the philosophic synthesis of his experience, and it is 
for this reason that any discussion of his orientation towards 
progressivism or conservatism must be based very largely upon.an 
understanding of his dramas. 
In Hebbel's view all life is a struggle of the individual with the 
whole,3 a struggle that develops and reveals the individual's 
character.4 It is a struggle that is integral to the life process itself, 
and finds its truest expression in the drama, in which is revealed 
the critical relation of the individual to the Idea: the individual 
is opposed to the Idea by virtue of an incomprehensible freedom, 
having escaped from the nexus of the Idea and yet remaining a 
part of it.5 The drama exercises its real function only where there 
is such a problem, 6 and, when successful, is superior to philosophy 
in performing the task which is common to them both. Philo-
sophy has really failed in its part of the common task, and has 
never demonstrated the inevitability of the process of individua-
tion, whereas art has always been able to perform its part, which 
is to change the discord of individuation to harmony through 
the resolution of the individual in the Idea, so that the breach 
caused by the incomprehensible freedom of the individual is 
closed. The breach which is to be closed by art is a necessary 
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consequence of the mere fact of individuation, the original sin 
which is integral to every human being by virtue of his mere 
existence as such. 7 Life is the attempt of the rebellious part to 
tear itself loose from the Whole, an attempt which can be success-
ful only as long as the strength lasts which the part has usurped 
in making itself free of the Whole.8 The original sin of individ-
uation has nothing to do with the goodness or wickedness of a 
person, is in no way dependent upon the tendency or quality of 
will, but only the existence of the individual constitutes the trans-
gression, which may, on the human level, have the guise of 
morality as well as immorality. This is the only transgression with 
which the highest form of the drama is concerned and it is im-
material for the drama whether the hero perishes in a laudable or 
reprehensible endeavor. In fact, the tragedy of a laudable en-
deavor is the more poignant and cathartic spectacle.0 There is only 
one necessity: that the world be maintained. The weffare of the 
individuals in the world is of no consequence. The evil things they 
do, since these things constitute a threat to the world, must be 
punished, but there is no reason why they should receive com-
pensation for the misfortunes they suffer. 
The respect in which Hebbel considers art as having been 
successful, in contrast to philosophy, is in a kind of re-creation 
of the cosmic process by which the individual is reabsorbed by 
the Idea. Actually, to be sure, the endeavor of the part to be free 
of the Whole is futile. Just as the air supplies us with vital physi-
cal [chemical] substances, so the spirit breathes and has its being 
in God. Every thought, every feeling is a drawing of the breath. 
It is folly to think that it is possible to detach oneself :from God. 
To commit sin is about the same as a wilful attempt to stop 
breathing: the air will force its way, so to speak, of its own ac-
cord.10 Yet, as we have seen, sin, in the particular metaphysical 
sense of the present context, is inevitable simply because the in-
dividual does and can exist only as an individual. If the individual 
denies itself, then its living is only a dying, an unnatural and use-
less withering. However, although the individual exists only as 
such, it none the less has no duty more sacred than to try to tear 
itself out of itself, for only in this way can it attain to a conscious-
ness or even to a sense of itself.11 The resolution of the discord 
of individuation is accomplished in the drama, which dissolves the 
basic dualism when it becomes too poignant, and a reconciliation 
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is effected between the part and the Whole. The reconciliation, and 
this means the tragic elimination of the individual through re-
absorption by the Idea, can take place in either of two ways : it 
may be incomplete, and then the individual goes down defiant and 
unbroken, which means that the form of individuation that he 
represents will reappear, or else it is complete and the individual, 
in perishing, has gained a purified insight into its relation to the 
Whole, and passes away in peace.12 
The original cause of individuation, which it would be the 
task of philosophy to determine, is unfathomable. The drama 
passes over this problem, accepting the fact of individuation as a 
prime condition of life, and makes no attempt to reach a solution. 
It is here that the drama and the ultimate mystery are lost in 
one and the same night: even though the metaphysical breach is 
closed, why did it have to occur at all? To this question Hebbel 
never found the answer and believed that no one will ever find it 
who asks it in real seriousness.13 
An examination of Hebbel's plays will have to be concerned 
with the problem of the guilt or relative justification of the tragic 
characters and of their antagonists, as well as with the nature of 
the conflict and the opposing forces. As regards the concept of 
guilt, Hebbel seems to have been rather inconsistent: on the one 
hand, he speaks of the guilt or sin of individuation and, on the 
other, seems to feel that the highest tragic effect is reached when 
there is no guilt and the individual perishes through some praise-
worthy endeavor. The guilt which enhances the tragic effect 
through its absence is ordinary guilt on the human level, the k1nd 
of guilt associated with the wrong done one human being by 
another. This kind of guilt is irreleva:nt to tragedy. Tragic or 
dramatic guilt, unlike personal sin in Christian belief, is not a 
functon of the direction or intent of human will, but is a direct 
function of the will itself. Dramatically, it is a matter of complete 
indifference whether the hero perishes while doing good or evil. 
Dramatic guilt alone is the concern of tragedy, the highest form 
of art. 
The twofold use of the term guilt involves an obvious difficulty 
or confusion, stemming, on the one hand, from Hebbel's par-
ticular use of the term in the sense of metaphysical guilt, and, 
on the other, from the traditional sense of the certain flaw in 
character of which Aristotle speaks in the thirteenth chapter of 
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the Poetics, a moral defect in the tragic hero which, although it 
may be out of proportion to his tragic fate, may nevertheless be 
considered the cause of the hero's involvement in the mortal 
struggle with forces which defeat him. Because the term tragic 
guilt or tragic flaw is liable to such a misinterpretation, it 
seems desirable to suggest a term to replace it that will not 
carry the note of moral censure and yet will suggest the idea of 
some trait of character, some circumstance, or perhaps con-
junction of circumstances, which lets tragic forces in upon the 
tragic persons in a play to destroy them. At some point there 
is a crack in the hero's armor, not necessarily a weakness, not 
necessarily a virtue; it is merely a point where the tragic forces 
are assembled and concentrated, where they are brought to a 
focus and burn through. This point may be called the tragic focus 
and will be so called in the present discussion. To be sure, in some 
instances in Hebbel's plays, for example, Meister Anton or Agnes 
Bernauer, it would be hard to speak of a tragic focus within the 
individual, since the whole being of such a character is the focus-
sing point of the tragic force. 
It will also be necessary to consider carefully what the nature 
of the tragic force is in Hebbel's drama, who or what the anta-
gonists are, and to what extent the antagonists are justified re-
latively to one another. To anticipate a bit, examples of relevant, 
specific questions that must be answered are: Are the opponents 
in Agnes Bernauer Albrecht and Agnes on the one hand and 
Duke Ernst on the other? Are Agnes and Ernst equally in the 
right by standards of human morality, and, if so, does tnis mean 
that Ernst is justified and Agnes must be sacrificed only because 
of the fact that the conflict took place at a particular time and 
place in history and that nothing more is required than a shift of 
historical perspective in the direction of social progress for 
Agnes to be fully justified, and presumably, untouched by trage-
dy? 
In the essay, Mein Wort ilber das Drama, Hebbel points out that 
it is not his conception that the tragic conflict is on the level 
of the individual human opponents. This essay was written in 
reply to Professor J. L. Heiberg, an authority of some note in 
Copenhagen on aesthetic and philosophical matters, who had made 
an attack on a somewhat earlier essay of HebbeJ, Ein Wort ilber 
das Drama. Heiberg had written that there was reason to f eeJ 
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that Hebbel abstracted life from the objective forces which de-
termine it with the result that his drama presents mere individ-
uals quite detached from the eternal principle. Hebbel indignantly 
denies that this is true: his use of the terms transgressing in-
dividual (Ei~elheit, die nicht Mass zu halten weiss) and guilt 
(Schuld) imply the existence of a principle which can be sinned 
against. Sin is not a term which is applicable to the relation of one 
individual to another but implies a transcendent principle. An 
individual can be sinned against by other individuals only if he 
is the representative of such a transcendent principle, and the 
justification of opposing individuals is in proportion to the 
strength which they derive from the transcendent principle they 
embody.14 Hebbel's conception is, therefore, that in his drama it 
is possible to speak only of metaphysical justification of the op-
ponents and this necessarily implies that the tragic conflict is not 
on the level of individual human opponents. Thus, the tragic 
hero may have a human enemy but the Adversary is always God. 
The tragic conflict of individual and Idea, that is, of man 
and God, is particularly evident in times of flux and it is only 
in times of flux that great drama can be written: it is the func-
tion of the drama, as the highest form of art, to represent the_ 
critical relation of the individual to the Idea, a relation which 
becomes apparent in its problematic aspects in the transition 
from one epoch of history to another. This does not, however, 
imply that the dramatist is limited to portraying such times of 
transition, for then the scene of all great dramas would have to 
be laid either in Greece at the time of the great tragic poets, 
or in western Europe, particularly England, at the time of Shalce-
speare, or in Europe in the nineteenth century, that is, at the 
time of Hebbel. Before the nineteenth century there have Been two 
great historical crises. One was in the Greek world when the dia-
lectic of the pagan drama subordinated the individual to Fate, 
and the other was in the emerging Protestant world when Shake-
speare's drama emancipated the individual, admitting no limits 
to his expansive power, so that Shakespeare's characters, so far 
as they are men of action, eliminate every living being about 
them, or, so far as they are men of ideas, would by means of tbe 
most daring and terrifying questions eliminate God from the 
world. This Hebbel calls putting the dialectic in the individual. 
The third possibility is to put the dialectic in the Idea and this 
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is the process which Hebbel believes Goethe began and did not 
finish and is the great problem of the nineteenth century.15 This 
leads to an examination and analysis of the Idea, an attempt to 
make it reveal its true nature, not with the hope of changing it, 
which is impossible, but with the hope of establishing morality 
on a true metaphysical basis. According to this thoroughly con-
servative point of view nineteenth-century man does not want 
new and unique institutions but only a better foundation for those 
already existing. He wants to have them supported by nothing 
but morality and necessity, which are identical, and thus gain 
their own peculiar and inherent center of gravity.16 From what 
we already know about Hebbel's vision of the world, it is ap-
parent that the attainment of a metaphysical basis for morality 
can be possible only through the individual's gaining an insight 
into the nature of his relation to the Idea: when a human being 
comprehends his relation to the universe under the aspect of in-
evitability, he has completed his development and has actually 
ceased to be an individual, for the concept of this inevitability, the 
capacity to attain to it, and the strength to adhere to it, is the 
universal principle embodied in the individual, wipes out all un-
justified egotism, and frees the spirit from death by anticipating 
it in the essentials.17 The perfect individual must therefore be one 
with the Idea, that is, surrender his individuality. The fact that 
we have knowledge of ourselves is the reason that we do not have 
complete knowledge of God. The highest beings have no knowl-
edge of themselves but of God only.18 
Knowledge of herself which obscures her vision of God might 
be a formula for expressing the tragic focus of Judith,19 the 
heroine of the first of the plays which fall entirely within the peri-
od of sharp fluctuation already discussed (p. 5 above). From the 
moment she first hears of him Holofernes threatens to drive her 
God out of Judith's heart: "I would like to see him," she says, 
and is immediately dismayed by a desire which intuition tells her 
is sinful. For three years she has been living in a strange sort of 
widowhood: her husband had died some months after her wed-
ding without ever having known her as his wife. Some terrible 
force had kept him from approaching her on their wedding night 
and they had lived together in an unconsummated union. Judith 
had thus been singled out and set aside to be used as an instru-
ment in the working out of a divine purpose, to save her people 
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from conquest and extermination by Holofernes. But the very 
experience which made it possible for her to become the instru-
ment of God's will also made her peculiarly liable to become 
estranged from God. In fact, the estrangement was a necessary 
part of the instrumentality: the only access she could have to 
Holof ernes to bring down divine retribution upon him was as a 
woman, an access which could be suggested to her only by her 
personal desire. Thus, the very first step she undertakes is a step 
towards tragedy, regardless of the outcome of her undertaking; 
had Holofernes responded to her womanliness as matching his 
power and raised the siege of Bethulia for her sake, even so the 
end would have been tragic for Judith, since Holofernes woufd 
have come between her and her God. Holofernes, however, sees 
in her only a means of satisfying his sensual appetites, a rather 
more stimulating intoxicant than wine, and uses her as such. 
Judith's deed, which saves her people and thus serves the divine 
purpose, springs directly from her outraged personal feelings 
which force her to kill the only man she might have loved, who 
. alone could have given meaning to her life. Indeed, it is only the 
sense of outrage which gives her the strength to commit the deed, 
which, as she feels afterwards, is the worst crime of woman, and 
for which she desires to be punished. She exacts a promise from 
the elders to kill her if she requires death from them, but makes 
her life or death dependent upon the will of her divine Adversary: 
if God does not let her bear the child who must one day demand 
a reckoning of her, she can live. The obscurity of the issue is a 
consequence of the curse which rests upon humanity: the individ-
ual, even though he may in holy zeal consecrate himself as a sacri-
fice to God, is never a pure sacrifice, for sinful death is the nec-
essary consequence of sinful birth ; even though Judith falls for 
the sins of all, in her own consciousness she falls only for her own 
sin. For this reason the ending must be inconclusive, permitting 
either outcome. 20 
Judith and Holofernes are more than individuals, they are 
also representatives of their people. Judith is the dizzy peak of 
the people which believed it was in direct personal relation with 
God. Holofernes represents the excess of cruelty of a polytheism 
so extreme that it takes the last step and deifies the individual 
man, conceives the idea of a God to be born of mankind. Holo-
fernes not only has this conception of the Man-God, he believes 
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he is the Man-God. The heathen, polytheistic manifestation of the 
Idea, represented by Holofernes, and the Hebrew, monotheistic 
manifestation of the Idea, represented by Judith, conflict, at a 
time when mankind has not yet reached the point at which direct 
intervention by God would be unnecessary.21 It is the direct in-
tervention of God which constitutes the active tragic force of 
the play, destroying both Holofernes, who is in opposition to God 
in His monotheistic manifestation, and Judith, who is His in-
strument. Holofernes, the extreme concentration of heathen 
brutality, to which the notion of conquering itself is alien, through 
his mere existence challenges the Adversary and is defeated by 
means of the woman whom the Adversary has set aside as a wea-
pon that will shatter even as it deals the mortal blow. Despite the 
fact that not only the individual that is opposed to the triumph-
ant form of the Idea, _but also the individual that serves this 
form of the Idea is destroyed, the play represents a progressive 
point of view: the brute strength of polytheism, having gone 
through an orgy of destruction and unable to control itself, could 
end only in the self-destruction for which Holofernes longs. Since, 
in Hebbel's view, the one necessity is that the world maintain it-
self, this form of the Idea must be replaced by a new form, which 
will allow life to go on. 
If knowledge of self which obscures her vision of God might 
be a formula for expressing Judith's tragic focus, knowledge of 
God through perfect saintliness might be a formula for expressing 
the tragic focus of Genoveva. 22 Hebbel comments upon her charac-
ter in his diaries :23 her suffering is merely external and at the 
same time it justifies and develops the deepest elements of her 
nature, the religious elements: she is a completely Christian char-
acter, who is not consumed but transfigured by being burned at 
the stake ; as far as she is concerned, the main intention of the 
play is to show how she attains to the same relationship to God 
as she once had to her husband, that for her profane love was 
always sacred love which had not become aware of itself. In 
the play itself Genoveva is almost identified witli God, the 
only line of demarcation between them being Genoveva's finite 
existence. This almost complete identity is brought out 
not only in the final episode of sanctification in the epilogue,24 
which was written at the beginning of Hebbel's final conservative 
period (p. 15 above), but also in the play itself, which belongs to 
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the same period as Judith (p. 5 above) through the circum-
stance that Golo, having tempted Providence by scaling the 
tower which it had been certain death to climb, then repeatedly 
tempts Genoveva in the same way. That is, climbing the tower 
is a kind of metaphysical experiment :25 having a premonition of 
the monster that he would show himself to be, he hoped by this 
to challenge God to doom him and let him fall to his death, the 
more so since the feat was so dangerous that Golo's success in 
climbing it and returning in safety signified to him not only that 
God had not struck him down but had even sustained him,26 a 
proof that it was his destiny to be a villain.27 It is the same kind 
of decision that he repeatedly demands of Genoveva, feeling that 
it is God who speaks to him through her mouth :28 lie asks her 
to speak for God and say whether a person who feels that he must 
inevitably become a monstrous criminal has the right to take his 
Iife29 and when she refuses to reply, by insisting that her silence 
will mean her consent to his suicide, he forces her to bid h1m to 
remain alive, just as in the prison scene he forces her to pour 
out the poisoned wine he has prepared for himself, that is, take a 
positive step to prevent his death, even though taking this step 
will impel him to press on to the ultimate in his infamous en-
deavor to possess or kill her. Despite, or rather, because of being 
God's representative on earth, Genoveva is not immune to extreme 
tragic suffering. To any other woman there would have been one, 
perhaps two ways to avert the torture inflicted upon her by Golo, 
the separation from her husband, the fatal hardships of living 
in the wilderness. The one, the baser and less certain way, would 
have been to yield to Golo or pretend to, lay a trap for him, and 
either unmask him before her faithful Drago and the others or 
kill him as Judith killed Holofernes. The other. the certain way, 
would have been to consent to his suicide. Neither alternative, of 
course, could be possible for the pure instrument of God's will. In 
the epilogue, Genoveva, having been perfected in saintliness 
through her suffering, appears to her husband in order to receive 
justification in the sight of the world, and having gained insight 
into the nature of her relation to the Idea has so far ceased to be an 
individual in her anticipation of being reabsorbed into God 
through death (cf. p. 28 above) that she prays for only seven days 
of life together with Siegfried before her final dissolution. 
If Genoveva's tragic focus lies in the fact that she is, as an in-
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dividual, so nearly at one with God as to be His representative 
and instrument on earth and, being an instrument, must necessari-
ly experience the wielder of the instrument as the Adversary, 
Golo's tragic focus is of an entirely different kind. His whole 
being is a challenge to the Adversary, from the moment that the 
vision of perfect goodness and beauty arouse in him unlimited 
evil. In a passage omitted from the play Golo was to have said 
that under the aspect of the eternal the individual is already 
everything that he can become, and in his diaries30 Hebbel makes 
the additional comment upon this idea that in the sight of God 
the sins of individuals against each other will not count, but only 
the sins against the Idea itself and in this regard actual and 
merely potential sins are completely identical. Golo's villainy is, 
indeed, identical with his highest capacity, and once quickened by 
Genoveva's perfect beauty which he desires and may not possess, 
it must manifest itself in a necessary succession of ever more 
terrible forms. 31 Golo is aware of this fatal compulsion to attain 
to a full realization of his potentialities; he knows that there is 
only one way to forget that one is a robber: to become a murderer, 
then a parricide, and after that there is nothing left but to de-
stroy the world, to murder God Himself.32 His mere existence 
threatens God. It is because he becomes aware of this in his pas-
sion for Genoveva, which makes him disloyal to Siegfried even 
in the first stirring of desire, that in climbing the tower he de-
mands a divine judgment whether he is to live or die. This same 
judgment he demands of Genoveva, and he receives the same 
sentence: he must live. By constantly retreating, so to speak, God 
allows the rebellious individual to continue his dreadful advance, 
from which there is no turning back for Golo save by tbe im-
possible denial of self, and which must end, when he believes he 
has encompassed Genoveva's death, in terrible self-castigation 
and destruction: he tears out his eyes and prepares to meet slow 
death in the wilderness. Golo's slaying by Caspar is a merciful 
release from life, to which the Adversary had doomed him in 
retribution for his revolt. 
Golo is condemned to live by the same tragic force, the will 
of God, which requires suffering of Genoveva. If it is true that 
Genoveva's destiny must be fulfilled so that Golo's hell may be 
complete,33 it is also true that Golo's tragic unfolding of original 
sin must take place so that Genoveva may attain the same relation 
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to God that she once had to Siegfried.34 Both Golo and Genoveva 
are crushed in the accomplishment of a cosmic process. Genoveva, 
the frail and finite representative of God, says to Golo: If God 
protects the youth's [i.e.Golo's] sacrilegious boldness, it is a sign 
that His eye has already seen the day when He will have need of 
the man.35 Revelation of the cosmic ·process is the inner purpose 
of the play, its idea, which Hebbel felt to be also the source of its 
weakness. He wrote in his diary :36 "The flaw of the play is the 
flaw of its idea, the worst that it can have; this idea is the 
Christian one of expiation and atonement by saints." The flaw 
lies in the fact that this idea does not permit the play to be the 
tragedy of Genoveva but it must be her glorification. For this 
reason Genoveva cannot and may not be in the forefront of at-
tention37 and Golo is actually the main character. This division of 
interest and the split in the unity of the play which Hebbel real-
ized and which caused him concern,38 does tend to detract from the 
revelation of the cosmic process.39 At the same time, however, it is 
most characteristic for Hebbel's conception of the tragic that 
Golo as well as Genoveva is each necessary for the consummation 
of the other's destiny: Genoveva is the instrument which God al-
lows Golo to use to destroy himself; Golo is the instrument 
through which Genoveva attains perfect saintliness and ultimate 
unity with God. 
In the tragic attainment of perfect saintliness Genoveva 
serves a great cosmic purpose. What this purpose is, is revealed 
by the spirit of the murdered Drago who appears to pronounce 
doom on the witch Margareta, the incarnation of evil: in the be-
ginning God promised never to exterminate the sinful human 
race if every thousand years only one individual should prove 
worthy. The critical time is now at hand and it is Genoveva who 
can avert the punishment through her purity and suffering. In 
seven years her time of trial will be over, she will be assumed in-
to eternal glory and mankind will be saved.40 The depravity and 
wickedness which threaten to provoke divine retribution are rep-
resented in various episodes and characters in the play : Mar-
gareta is the pure incarnation of evil; ordinary Christians have 
become so brutal that they wish to stone a Jew merely for hav-
ing drunk from a fountain which a diseased dog might use with 
impunity; the various retainers in Siegfried's castle show an ap-
palling brutality and readiness to consort with evil. It is an age 
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which is ripe for a terrible crisis and can be saved only by the 
vicarious atonement of Genoveva, and this, as we have seen, Heb-
bel felt was the inner idea of the play. 
The historical crisis lies in the conflict of Christianity and Is-
lam. Although no exact indication of the time of the play is given 
by the play itself, the list of persons carrying only the notation, 
"The Poetic Age," Hebbel probably did have a rather definite 
time in mind. At any rate, less than a year after the completion 
of Genoveva he noted in his diary41 that the battle at Poitiers 
where Charles Martell defeated Abd-er-Rhaman, the leader of 
the Moslems, occurred in 732 and that therefore the action of 
Genoveva takes place in that year.42 The advance of the Mos-
lems to Poitiers constituted a very serious threat to Christianity 
and in terms of Hebbelian tragedy would be one of the great 
historical crises in which opposing manifestations of the Idea 
contend for superiority. Victory of the Moslems would have 
meant the emergence of a new form of the Idea, which showed 
itself not only mightier but even worthier than the old form of the 
Idea or Christianity. The demonstration of the moral worthiness 
of Islam is the purpose of the episode of the returning kniglit, 
Tristan, who made a vow never to lift his sword against a Moslem 
because of his kind and humane treatment by Fatima, the daugh-
ter of the Moslem he had served as a slave. Despite this serious 
threat, the older form of the Idea or Christianity, is triumphant 
in Genoveva, and the old covenant, by which God promised to 
withold his punishment if one human being could withstand all 
tribulations and temptations, is renewed. The established order 
is upheld, no transition to a new stage is represented in Genoveva, 
the play is conservative. 
The comedy, Der Diamant,43 from the same period as the 
preceding plays (p. 5 above), is the story of a Jew who swallows 
a diamond he has stolen in order to keep it in his possession. He 
has reckoned without the cupidity and desires of a great many 
other people who will stop at nothing to obtain the diamond : 
because the Jew cannot produce the stone, he loses all human 
worth and autonomy, does not become the owner of a piece of 
property, but himself constitutes a piece of property. Each person 
in the play desires the stone for a di:ff erent and cliaracteristic 
reason and in his attempts to gain possession of it reveals his in-
most character. The value of the diamond is not intrinsic: to some 
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it represents release from poverty and the power to do good, to 
others it represents a means of satisfying greed, to others it is a 
symbol of the continuing power and welfare of the ruling dynasty 
and the state. Hebbel's conception of the significance of objects 
as symbols has already been touched upon in connection with the 
passage from his diaries about the paving blocks of the state (cf. 
p. 14) and will again be touched upon in connection with Gyges 
und sein Ring, where it is of great significance for the bearing 
it has upon the question under consideration in the present study: 
the veil, the sword, and the crown are symbols for enduring tra-
ditional values. The diamond symbol is a grotesque and comic 
inversion of the veil, sword, and crown symbol, and serves to 
illuminate the empty illusoriness and futility of earthly life. The 
mood of the comedy is too disillusioned, too skeptical of human 
values and ambitions to be either progressive or conservative. 
A similar feeling of skepticism, disillusionment, disbelief in 
both past and future finds very serious and gripping expression 
in another play from the period of violent fluctuation outlinecf in 
the first part of this study (pp. 5-9, esp. 7-8), Maria Magda-
lene,44 the drama through which Hebbel intended to regenerate 
middle-class tragedy by showing that crushing tragedy is possible 
even in the narrowest circle if the dramatist knows how to derive 
it from the proper elements, that is, elements which are inherent 
in this circle itself.45 The narrow circle, to which all the charac-
ters in the play belong, is the lower middle class of society in 
Hebbel's own time. Not only do the characters belong to this class 
but they almost all unquestioningly accept its code of morality. 
its standards of values and behavior. With the partial exceptions 
of the secretary and Klara's brother Karl, they all so completely 
accept this moral code and identify themselves with this society 
that none of them seriously questions the necessity and appro-
priateness of his or her actions. As Hebbel writes46 to the actress, 
Auguste Stich-Crelinger, the tragedy does not come from a con-
flict of the middle class with the upper class but from the obdu-
racy of the patriarchal traditions of the middle class itself and 
its inability to adapt itself to a complicated situation, so that 
Klara's fate is occasioned by a trivial transgression and none l;be 
less grows to terrifying proportions.47 
Klara's father, Meister Anton, is the central figure, completely 
identified with the moral code of which he and all the others are 
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victims. A model of upright middle-class honesty and respecta-
bility, he is tyrannical in his home, intolerant in his dealings with 
everyone he does not consider respectable, not because he takes 
pleasure in wounding others, but because he is convinced that his 
moral duty prescribes extreme rigidity and that there is no other 
way of discharging the obligations he owes himself, his family, 
and society. His household is governed in all its details by specific 
regulations, none of them triv\~l: the hat belongs on the third 
nail, not the fourth, at ten-thirty it is time to be tired, before 
Martinmas no freezing, after Martinmas no sweating, thou shalt 
love and fear God-thus Karl sums up the rigid control from 
which he seeks to escape.48 Meister Anton has developed all this 
grim discipline of himself and others as a protection against 
the jibes and censure of society. When telling Leonhard about 
his first master, Meister Gebhard, who took him on as an appren-
tice, gave him food and lodging instead of demanding to be paid, 
and occasionally sent him home to his impoverished and widowed 
mother with half a ham, tears come to his eyes, betraying that, 
deep within him there is still the sensitive nature, wliich was 
constantly and deeply wounded, as he says, by the sharp porcu-
pine's quills that were directed inward, until he reversed them 
and made them point out.49 The gruff and bitter manner, which 
others fear, however, has by no means made him independent of 
society, but, on the contrary, has made him still more completely 
subservient. He must conform and make his family conform to 
all the minutiae of middle-class conventions, so as to avoid being 
the object of pity or scorn.50 He can, and has proved that he can, 
endure anything at all except disgrace. He says to Klara that dis-
grace would sever the nerve that holds him together.51 
Klara knows this, therefore she does not doubt for an instant 
that Meister Anton will cut his throat, as he says he will, if it 
becomes evident that Klara is to bear an illegitimate child. More-
-0ver, she does not seem to feel that he is wrong about this but 
acquiesces to his threatened action as necessary, even, perhaps, 
right, if her disgrace is revealed, and she is driven by only one 
purpose, to stave off the fatal disgrace by any means. Or rather, 
she is ready to resort to any means but one and that is to deceive 
Friedrich, the secretary, whom she has never ceased to love, and 
who, as he reassured her too late, also loves her. Thus, if Meister 
Anton is the victim of the moral code which he upholds, the same 
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holds true with even greater poignancy for Klara. Even her ori-
ginal transgression stems f:r;om her endeavor to comply with what 
is expected of her. When Friedrich, the childhood friend whom 
she came to love and who she believed returned her love, left 
his home to complete his studies, he thereby in the estimation of 
the townspeople raised himself to a higher level of society where 
Klara could not follow him. When he stopped writing to her the 
village gossips began to mock her for still thinking of him and 
aspiring to be more than she was. Even her mother urged upon 
her the greater suitability of Leonhard, her social equal. Her own 
wounded feelings and the desire to show Friedrich that she 
was not entirely dependent upon him contributed a bit also to her 
resolution to accept Leonhard as her fiance:32 Even the motives 
which led her to agree to Leonhard's demand that she demonstrate 
the solemnity of their betrothal by the only proof he could not 
doubt, to accord him nuptial rights before their marriage, dia not 
involve a basic deviation from the accepted moral code. Seeing 
Friedrich at the dance made her acutely aware that tlie old love 
was not dead, so that Leonhard seemed to be asking no more than 
the legitimate assurance that she had been honest in betrothing 
herself to him. Besides, if she was honest in this, no r1sk 
was involved, scarcely even the moderate disapproval of society, 
which was quite prepared to tolerate such a license if on1y it was 
legitimized later.53 If in Meister Anton the over-scrupulous regard 
for honor, the thing itself, is at least matched by his regard for 
the appearance of honor, this is not the case with Klara. True, 
she tries with utter desperation to save her father by keeping 
up the appearance of honor, but it is her fundamental honesty 
and personal integrity, the very flower of her code and Meister 
Anton's, which is the direct cause of her tragedy. To prove her 
honesty even to herself she had to consent to Leonhard's demand. 
To maintain her own integrity she cannot take the only way out 
of her tragic situation that remains open-to conceal her condi-
tion from Friedrich, marry him, and secure the appearance of 
legitimacy which would save her father and herself, at least, her 
· outward self. 
To deceive Friedrich is the only way that she could take out 
of her tragic situation which she could be sure would save ap-
pearances. It is not, however, the only way out: there is another 
way or could have been, if Friedrich were not also controllea by 
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the automatic reactions of convention. Even though he and Klara 
have just declared their love for each other, his first exclamation 
when she tells him of her condition is: "No man can get over 
that !"M It is this that seals Klara's doom. The hope she was be-
ginning to conceive that in Friedrich love and compassion might 
prove powerful enough to enable him to conquer his natural dis-
may for her sake is dashed to the ground and there remain only 
two things for her to do: implore Leonhard to marry her, and, 
this failing, take her life in a way that would seem to be an acci-
dent. Friedrich's response seals his own doom also: he goes to 
kill Leonhard in a duel, so that the one person who knows about 
the situation will not remain alive to relish his knowledge and 
share it with others. The duel is fatal to both participants and 
in his dying moments, as he speaks with Klara's father and 
realizes that Klara has taken her own life, Friedrich sees also that 
he had it in his power to save them all by brushing aside the over-
rigid system of morality and convention which has claimed as its 
victims the very people who have done everything to uphold it. 
This rigid system of morality and convention is, of course, 
the current embodiment of the Idea. In Maria Magdalene, how-
ever, there is not, as there is in the other plays discussed hitherto, 
a rival form of the Idea which threatens the position of the estab-
lished form, but, as has been pointed out, the tragic discord is 
inherent in prevailing conditions. None of the characters cham-
pions or even represents a different conception of morality: the 
secretary realizes that the old system is at fault but dies 
because he conforms to it; Karl merely wishes to run away from 
something he doesn't like, but he real~y stands for the same thing 
in a brutalized form; "When Father isn't here your brother is 
your guardian," he cries as he snatches Leonhard's letter out of 
Klara's hand ;55 even Leonhard, base and worthless as he is, has 
no sense of being in conflict with his society and seeks merely 
to secure an assured place in it for himself. Klara, except for 
her transgression, would be a pure and noble embodiment of the 
Idea, and Meister Anton is the Idea incarnate in individual form. 
When we then consider that it is Meister Anton from whom 
emanates the force which drives them all, himself includea, to 
tragedy or ruin, it becomes clear that this means that the principle 
of self-destruction is lodged in the prevailing form of the Idea. 
The most complete objectivation of this form of the Idea would 
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leave no room for the individual, which, as we know from our 
consideration of material from the diaries and letters, must exist 
in order that the Idea may have life. Since the only necessity is 
that the world maintain itself, the rigid middle-class form of the 
Idea is ripe for a change, and there are indications in the play 
that a change is coming: the increasing literacy among the very 
young is undermining the authority of the older generation which 
does not have facility in reading and writing ;56 even Karl, who is 
not sensitive enough to question the system, seeks to escape from 
it; the dying secretary understands that Anton bears the respon-
sibility for the entire tragedy. Even so the play can scarcely be 
called progressive: the symptoms of change do not indicate the 
coming of a worthier and higher form. Karl is brutal, Friedrich 
ineffective, and Meister Anton, who no longer undersltands the 
world, is stricken but unbowed, baffled and unyielding. He has 
gained no insight into his relation to the Adversary. 
In Julia,51 begun towara the end of the period of sharp fluc-
tuation and completed in the very short period of optimistic pro-
gressivism (pp. 5 and 11), Hebbel made another attempt at di-
rect criticism of contemporary society and, in a sense, repeated 
the basic situation of Maria Magdalene. In Julia it is Julia's 
father, Tobaldi, who is an almost exact parallel to Meister Anton, 
being, if anything, even more extreme, even more unyielding, 
even less aware of his relation to the Absolute and of its destruc-
tive rigidity. Julia herself, however, is not an exact parallel to 
Klara, because the father of her illegitimate child is Antonio, the 
man she loves. He has been prevented from making her his wife 
by a serious wound which had been inflicted upon him by the 
rebellious brigands whose leader he has been. In Antonio, the 
robber's son, Hebbel wished to portray the hopeless lot of a 
person who was born outside the pale of society,58 thus exposing 
what, on the basis of his experience in Italy, he took to be one 
of the major ills of his time, namely brigandage, a form of life 
in which the individual has no choice but to revolt against 
society. That is, if society is so constituted as to make large scale 
brigandage inevitable, this points to a serious defect in the form 
in which the Idea is realized. A third serious defect to which 
Hebbel wished to point was Iibertinism or decadence. This social 
evil is embodied in Count Bertram whose excesses have caused 
his physical ruin. Logically enough, it is Bertram who is suffi-
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ciently emancipated from the tyranny of an over-rigid moral code 
to take the step which the secretary in Maria Magdalene was un-
able to take, offers a means of salvation to the woman whose life 
is threatened because of her transgression against the social 
code: Bertram offers Julia the name and position of being his 
wife. Thus Bertram through voluntary recognition of his guilt 
surrenders himself completely to the moral Idea and sacrifices 
his rights as an individual,59 in this way closing the gap between 
the individual and the Absolute. 
It is true that Julia is unsuccessful: Hebbel allowed himself 
to overestimate the significance of what he had observed in Italy, 
taking superficial ills of society to be fundamental. Not only 
that, the main characters, Julia, Antonio, and Bertram, represent 
such divergent and incongruous problems that the whole action 
seems artificial, unconvincing, and contrived. None the less, the 
play has an interesting bearing upon the problem of progres-
sivism and conservatism in Hebbel and discloses an unrelieved 
pessimism and disillusionment: the successful opposition to the 
form of society which is responsible for the at least threatened 
tragedy of a Julia and an Antonio comes from a form represented 
by Bertram, which has obtained liberation and metaphysical 
reconciliation at the expense of making physical propagation of 
the individual impossible. Is decadence the answer to ruthless con-
vention? If so, it is an answer which gives very little hope for 
the future. 
Just as little hope for the future is held out by the other play 
which Hebbel based upon his experiences in Italy, Ein Trauerspiei 
in Sizilien,60 but which was written during that brief period dur-
ing which he seemed almost wholly committed to belief in social 
progress (p. 11). It represents the terrifying aspect of the police-
state, the agents of which may be -corruptible and evil, and also 
the extremes of the problem of possession and property.61 The 
rich Gregorio has promised to cancel Anselmo's ruinous debt 
to him in return for Anselmo's daughter Angiolina in marriage. 
Angiolina and her lover Sebastiano, knowing only that Anselmo 
opposes their marriage, resolve to elope and be married secretly. 
Angiolina comes first to the meeting place, is robbea. by two 
gendarmes, who then, largely to impress each other with tlieir 
ferocity and to avoid being found out as robbers, kill Angiolina. 
When Sebastiano comes they resolve to accuse him of the crime 
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and nearly succeed in convincing Gregorio and Anselmo, but the 
truth is revealed by a fruit-thief who had seen the whole affair 
from a tree in which he had hidden. This short play is intended 
as a tragi-comedy, which, according to Hebbel's theory, is the 
result whenever a tragic destiny is revealed in an untragic form, 
where the antagonists are, on the one hand, a human being strug-
gling but going down to defeat, and, on the other, not the justified 
moral force, but a quicksand of foul conditions which swallows up 
a thousand innocent victims. This, he felt, was the only adequate 
means of representing many contemporary events. 62 
Thus the impression left by these three plays of criticism of 
contemporary social conditions is one of profound pessimism. If 
contemporary conditions are so bad as to disintegrate because of 
their own inherent weakness, there is still no reason to hope for 
anything much better soon. The woes of the individual are too 
poignant to leave much opportunity for appreciating the beauty 
of a metaphysical reconciliation, even though the placfd surface 
of the Absolute is restored when the agitating ripples of the indi-
vidual }:lave subsided.62a 
Herodes und Mariamne,63 which was begun in the short period 
of progressivism and completed in the time of transition to con-
servatism (p. 11), is still more terrifying in its representa-
tion of ineluctable doom than the last three plays discussed, but it 
is, however, much less pessimistic and negative: whereas in Maria 
Magdal(!(}1,e, for instance, the feeling is that there is no star to 
guide humanity out of a hopeless situation, in H erodes und 
Mariamne the sense of hopelessness is mitigated by the historical 
perspective. Take this away and there would be little to choose 
between them in point of unrelieved pessimism. In both, the char-
acters move in orbits fixed in the nature of their social systems, 
they proceed along astronomical paths predetermined by the Ad-
versary. What Hebbel said 64 about the earlier play, that actual-
ly all the characters, even Leonhard, who is so base as to have 
no conception of anything finer, are in the right, and that it is 
therefore the mono-ideological petrifaction of life from which 
the whole disaster springs, he substantially repeats about H erodes 
und Mariamne in a letter65 to Eduard Janinski: the characters 
are all in the right, at no point do they end up in wickedness, 
and their destiny proceeds from the fact that they are precisely 
the characters they are and no others. This, applied to Herodes 
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himself, is rather amazing: how is it possible to maintain that 
the despot who ordered the death of all the infants in Bethlehem 
was not wicked? But there can be no doubt about Hebbel's in-
tention: in a letter to H. T. Rotscher he is perhaps even more 
emphatic in expressing his wish to let nothing in the play be 
dependent upon moods and decisions which have only a relative 
basis in the characters and relationships and can be one way or 
the other.66 Everyone who is human, he says, must feel the neces-
sity of Herodes' resolution, which is the efficient cause of 
everything and which seems to be not merely mysterious, in the 
sense of arising out of the indecipherable primeval depth of 
personality, but actually fantastic. The inflexible necessity, which 
is in this sense Herodes' justification, lies in the fact that what 
is ordinarily taken as background, the factors of time and place, 
rigidly determine the scope of action left to each character in the 
play. This is parallel to Maria Magdalene: Meister Anton em-
bodies the killing strictness of the moral code: if the individual 
moves at all he must move in a certain way and this means death 
and ruin. But Meister Anton as an individual is just as abso-
lutely bound by the rigid system he embodies and all real life is 
squeezed out of him by it. Herodes also embodies the prevailing 
form of the Idea: oriental despotism in its extreme disregard for 
individual life, but as an individual he is just as inevitably crushed 
as was any of his victims. The particular actions and events of 
Herodes und Mariamne, which seem so improbable and incredible, 
even though they are satisfactorily documented, it was Hebbel's 
intention to show as inevitably proceeding out of the general con-
ditions of the world, of the people, and the age; it was his inten-
tion to derive Herodes' delirium from the atmosphere he breathed 
and this, the atmosphere, from the vaporous volcanic earth on 
which he stood.67 
The volcanic earth on which Herodes must maintain his king-
dom is, indeed, both fiery and unstable. He is, of course, only a 
vassal king, his power completely dependent upon the interests of 
Rome and the whims of Antonius, who established him, per-
haps partly because of a certain esteem for him but mostly be-
cause of the tribute Herodes pays which enables Antonius to live 
in magnificence with Cleopatra.68 The Roman captain Titus is 
stationed in Jerusalem, ostensibly as Herodes' subordinate and 
commander of the legions which support him, but actually Titus 
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will serve him only as long as Herodes can continue to hold the 
kingdom together for Rome. He can and does hold the kingdom 
together by virtue of his extraordinary personal gifts of resolution 
and ruthlessness as well as by virtue of the fact that he is allied 
through marriage with the great line of the Maccabees. This 
hold upon the people is less firm than it was, however, because 
Herodes is interested in not merely holding the kingdom together 
but in creating a power which will be of some consequence in The 
world. To do this he feels he must break the religious isolationism 
of the Jews.69 Thus, although Herodes does embody oriental 
despotism in its ruthless disregard for human life, he is, and in 
this respect he is not the unqualified embodiment of the tradi-
tional form of the Idea that Meister Anton is, a kind of social re-
former also and has left the stage of despotism represented by the 
satraps, at whose court human beings served as clocks and living 
torches.70 The religious conservatism of the people is exploited by 
Sameas, the Pharisee, fanatical in his worship of the letter of the 
law and implacable in his hatred of the Romans and Herodes. He 
has fomented a conspiracy in which even an ineffectual blind man 
has a part merely out of hatred for Herodes. The conspiracy, how-
ever, flares into open revolt during the regency of Joseph and 
must be put down by violence by Titus and his soldiers. But 
Sameas in prison and a martyr is an even greater menace to 
Herodes than he was as a free man : he prophesies in his torment 
and foretells the birth of the Child who will rule forever.71 
However, the danger to Herodes from Sameas not only threatens 
his relations with his people but is inextricably bound up with 
the dangers that threaten him in his own household, for Samea~ 
is in league with Herodes' mother-in-law, Alexandra, each seek-
ing to use the other as an instrument to attain private ends. 
Alexandra is Herodes' most dangerous enemy: not only does she 
stir up popular revolt through Sameas and smuggle spies into 
Herodes' service72 but she tries by every device she can conceive to 
induce Antonius to turn against him. Except for Mariamne 
Herodes has no one whom he can love and trust: his mother 
is of no significance and his sister Salome is so dominated by 
hatred of Mariamne that she has kissed her only once, when 
Mariamne seemed to be on the point of death.73 In all this welter 
of venomous hatred Herodes, the man, is sustained by one thing, 
his love of Mariamne and hers of him. It is the one thing he 
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really has, the one thing he must keep at any cost, the best 
thing about him, and also his weak point, the tragic focus of 
his individuality. When the play opens we see him, so to speak, at 
the stage where every move that is left for him to make in the 
cosmic game of chess exposes both him and the queen he seeks to 
save to the impersonal malice of the Adversary. 
The decisive move in the game has been made just before the 
action of the play begins. Alexandra, scheming to find new ways 
to ruin Herodes, has had Aristobolus, her son and Mariamne's 
brother, consecrated to the office of high priest, the spiritual 
headship of the state, the equal and, under the right circum-
stances, the rival of the kingship. Aristobolus, being a thought-
less boy, had let himself be used in his mother's schemes to draw 
popular support away from Herodes and become a figure-head 
whom Antonius might use to replace Herodes. Alexandra had 
gone farther and sent a portrait of Aristobolus to Antonius in 
order to arouse in him a passion to possess Mariamne, whose 
resemblance to her brother was very great. The danger had be-
come so intense that Herodes was forced to have Aristobolus 
killed in a simulated accidental drowning. It is to answer before 
Antonius to the charge of murder that Herodes must leave for 
Alexandria. It is the death of Aristobolus that now threatens to 
take from him his only real possession, Mariamne's love, and he 
in turn takes the perverse and desperate measure to insure that 
she will never belong to another, but which even more surely 
takes her from him forever: fearing that the death of Aristobolus 
has estranged Mariamne, Herodes wants from her the assurance, 
an oath, that she will not become another man's wife, that she 
will die, if he does not return. Mariamne, who feels that her enjoy-
ment of Herodes' absolute trust has already been violated by 
Herodes' feeling it necessary to pretend mourning at Aristobolus' 
death, since she was not blind to the peril to the state which her 
brother represented,74 finds herself quite incapable of taking such 
an oath, indeed, affronted by the demand. But Herodes cannot see 
that in order to retain what he most cherishes he must be ready 
to let it go and leaves Joseph, his regent, with the secret order 
to kill Mariamne, should Herodes die, in order to prevent her 
from ever belonging to Antonius. Thus, although the play is in a 
certain sense a tragedy of love, as von Wiese maintains,75 draw-
ing the fire, intensity, and vividness of its characterization and 
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the relentless poignancy of its movement from this source, it is 
scarcely, as von Wiese seems to feel, basically a tragedy of love 
and secondarily an historical tragedy, but rather the tragedy of 
love is completely conditioned by the historical guise whicli the 
great Adversary has assumed. It is not Herodes' love or the 
failure of it that drives the events inexorably to tlie tragic out-
come, but it is the historical crisis which reveals or perhaps even 
causes the love of Herodes for Mariamne to be of a different order 
from the love which she can accept and return. 
For Mariamne, who was no less exposed than Herod es to the 
cross-currents of hatred and the threat of insecurity, her love for 
Herodes and his for her must mean no less than for Herodes the 
center of life, whose inviolability alone makes it possible to en-
dure the rest. Indeed, whereas for the man and the king love 
might be no more than the center of a life which is a constant 
unrelenting struggle, for this woman, even though a queen, love 
must fill life from the center to its utmost bounds: for Herodes 
love is something to have, for Mariamne it is something to be. 
Perhaps if Herodes had not been the king of Judea at that par-
ticular time in that particular situation he might have attained 
to a love of the same order as Mariamne's: at the crisis of de-
cision when he is about to leave for the second time, he seems to 
have some sense of what the issue is,76 but he cannot transcend 
the limits of his individual existence and so he cannot break off 
but instead gives fresh impetus to the chain of events which he 
began when he instructed Joseph to kill Mariamne in the event 
of his death at Antonius' hands. The limitations which he is thus 
unable to transcend are inherent in the form of the Idea which he 
represents : Oriental despotism with its norm of regarding the 
human being as a means of satisfying a purpose, desire, or whim. 
It is a love of this order against which Mariamne revolts, because 
she refuses to be a thing which the male and the sovereign can 
keep or discard as he might keep or discard a robe of state. She 
can forgive Herodes the killing of her brother,77 she is ready to 
forget that he ever gave Joseph the fateful order, to believe that 
this happened in a delirium which was not symptomatic of his 
inmost self,78 and so she rejoices when Herodes must leave her 
for the second time under the same conditions as the first, for 
now Herodes will have a chance to prove that his first act of pure 
despotism did not reveal his soul completely.79 This deed which 
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Mariamne feels can perhaps be repeated but surely never out-
done,80 Herodes does, in fact, outdo when he seems only to re-
peat it. This time his regent is Soemus, a very different man from 
the ineffectual Joseph, and Herodes' most sincere and trusted 
friend. Herodes, knowing that the very order to kill Mariamne 
is fatal to the one who receives it,81 none the less repeats it to 
Soemus, in whose case he cannot plead the alleviating circum-
stance of being blinded by sexual passion.82 But Soemus as well 
as Mariamne represents a new order of things, will not tolerate 
being iused as a tool by another human being, is just as deeply 
shocked at being forced to play a role which is fatal to him only 
because it suits Herodes' selfish purpose,83 and intentionally re-
veals to Mariamne the secret which Joseph had been unable to 
conceal. Mariamne, who has just accused Soemus of being dis-
loyal to his master, understands that Herodes has misused him 
just as he has misused her, has trampled upon the most sacred 
feeling of them both by reducing them to the status of thing.84 
Herodes' sin against Soemus added to his sin against Mariamne 
makes it plain beyond the possibility of doubt that a new concep-
tion of and belief in personality is stirring, not yet strong enough 
to triumph over the old, but, inasmuch as it reveals the bank-
ruptcy of the old conception, portentous of a new order. 85 Both 
Soemus and Mariamne perish at Herodes' hands. But Mariamne 
brings about an ironical and tragic triumph over the force which 
kills her:86 She, whom Herodes had thus degraded by making her 
the instrument of his desires, retaliates by making Herodes the 
unwitting instrument of her voluntary death :87 she makes it ap-
pear that she rejoices at the report of Herodes' death, pretends 
to be what Herodes feared she might be, so that when he returns 
he orders her trial and execution. The new form of the Idea goes 
down defiant, a sign, as we have seen (p. 25, above), that it will 
reappear. 
Both we and Hebbel's audience, viewing this crisis from the 
perspective of history, know that a new form of the Idea did 
appear, which stands for the belief in the sanctity of the individ-
ual. To make it clear beyond a doubt that this is the perspective 
from which the events of the play must be viewed, Hebbel lets us 
see the three Kings of the Orient following the star of Bethle-
hem. 88 Believing that the Infant-King they seek must have been 
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born in Herodes' house they arrive in the palace at the exact hour 
of Mariamne's death, and then, learning that this is not the place, 
go on to Bethlehem in their search. Herodes, feeling that the Babe 
will pluck the crown from his head, issues the order for all child-
ren born within the year to be slain, the extreme and futile meas-
ure of the despot to make himself secure : the golden circlet he 
clutches with convulsive grasp is now, after Mariamne's death, a 
mere bauble, and the era of the Infant-King cannot be held back. 
The fantastic fairy-tale comedy Der Rubin,89 which belongs in 
the emergent phase of the final conservative period (p. 15), shows 
its inner relationship with If erodes und Mariamne by being, in a 
sense, an extended commentary on the difficulty, almost impossi-
bility, of seeing that in order to retain what one most cherishes 
he must be ready to let it go. The idea was an old one with Heb-
bel: already in October or November 1836 he had written in his 
diary: "Wirf weg, damit Du nicht verlierst ! ist die beste Lebens-
regel,"90 and in 1843 he had published the prose-tale, Der Rubin, 
which related substantially the same story but without the empha-
sis on historical perspective which we find in the play. The fairy-
tale comedy is, briefly, the story of a poor but very honest fisher-
man named Assad, who in Bagdad comes into possession of a 
wonderful ruby, which, as he learns afterwards, is the magic 
prison of the caliph's beautiful daughter. A wicked sorcerer has 
transformed her into this shape and set one condition for her 
liberation: that the possessor of the ruby throw it away. This, 
however, Assad does not know and yet he does fulfill the condi-
tion: ready to defend the possession of the ruby with his life, 
when he sees that he must inevitably lose it in death, he throws it 
into a river so that it will not fall into unworthy hands, and the 
princess is released from the gem. 
In another respect also Der Rubin shows its relationship with 
Herodes und Mariamne and that is in its portrayal of oriental 
despotism. True, there is here no great historical crisis in the 
background. The political and social system of the caliphate dis-
poses of human life and liberty with sovereign indifference and 
the caliph himself once in a fit of drunkenness killed one of his 
wives, the mother of the girl who has been transformed. This 
has caused the caliph to have a greater reverence for the individ-
ual than his minions,91 in this respect representing a slightly ad-
vanced social view, although he himself feels that he used to be 
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an innovator, breaking the law of the Koran in regard to wine, for 
instance, and that he has therefore been converted to strict ob-
servance of the law. On the other hand, there is no doubt that 
Assad's assumption of the throne as a reward for freeing the 
caliph's daughter does represent a step forward in social pro-
gress. As one of the submerged millions who has known poverty 
and the danger of arbitrary execution he will necessarily be un-
able to forget or disregard the miserable state of the submerged 
millions.92 And, indeed, his first act as caliph is to liberate a man 
who has been arbitrarily put in chains and to state his intention 
to proclaim an amnesty. Assad's accession to power thus repre-
sents the emergence of a new social order, and the play is progres-
sive. 
A subject which had concerned Hebbel for a long time was his 
Moloch drama, of which he completed only two acts and left frag-
mentary sketches of the last three.93 His long continued interest 
in it (cf. pp. 5 and 15, above) and his frequently stated hope to 
make it his masterpiece indicate that it must be included in any 
consideration of Hebbel's dramatic production. In no other play 
is the antagonism of the individual and the divine Adversary so 
concretely symbolized. The last surviving Carthaginian, Hieram, 
priest of Moloch, has brought his iron god to Thule, that is, primi-
tive Germany, a land of savage hunters, who have neither re-
ligious belief nor any cultural skill. Hieram, having lost whatever 
faith he once may have had in Moloch, has determined to use the 
God to serve his own purpose: to subject the people of Thule to 
his will through arousing the sense of religious awe in them and 
to send them against Rome in retaliation for the destruction of 
Carthage. Up to a point Hieram is successful: Moloch becomes 
the dominant force in Thule and enables Hieram to rule the 
savages through Teut, the son of the old king, inasmuch as the 
younger Teut, particularly responsive to religious impulses, over-
throws his father and becomes Hieram's zealous agent. Through 
belief in Moloch the people are led to change their rude manner of 
existence, to begin to dominate nature by tilling the soil and 
controlling its productivity, to establish social, cultural, religious 
institutions, to develop the rudiments of poetry and art. The 
completed acts of the drama show how Moloch was established 
in Thule by Hieram, the rest of the play was to show how Hieram, 
when he begins to attempt to exploit Moloch for his individual 
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ends, is crushed by the iron Adversary he has raised up. He dies 
with the conviction that the divine principle even in its crudest 
form is more powerful than the mightiest man and that the in-
dividual must give way. But Hieram's achievements survive him, 
insofar as they merit survival, and at the end there is a glimpse 
into a world which grows more radiant with every day.94 The 
play is plainly progressive, showing the origination of political 
and religious conditions which survive to the present day,95 and 
showing in a mythico-poetic way the emergence of an ethnic 
group from barbarism into civilization. 
In Herodes und Mariamne we have seen a tragedy of love 
completely conditioned by the historical guise which the great 
Adversary has assumed. Presumably the same thing is true of 
Agnes Bernauer :96 it is surely a tragedy of love, and Duke 
Ernst, the human representative of the Adversary, in signing 
Agnes' death-warrant is sure, and his chancellor, Preising, against 
his will is forced to realize that no other course of action is 
possible. In fact, Ernst, like Golo, makes a "metaphysical exper-
iment," the outcome of which decides Agnes' fate: he disinherits 
his son and names his nephew to the succession, but the nephew 
dies through the will of God and thus Agnes' doom is sealed.97 
None the less the background factors of time and place do not 
in this play cast the events into a rigid and predetermined pat-
tern: it is not the background factors, for example, which make 
the death of Ernst's nephew inevitable. This event, upon which 
the tragic outcome hinges, does not depend upon the historical 
guise which the Adversary has assumed, as does the death of 
Aristobolus in Herodes und Mariamne. And besides, the fact that 
Duke Ernst does not appear on the stage until the beginning of 
the third act introduces the factor of the state in visible form at 
such an advanced point in the action that the play does, as a 
matter of fact, fall into two parts, the tragedy of love and beauty 
and the political tragedy. It is suggestive that Hebbel's own com-
ments about the play during the years that he was closer to it 
reveal a preponderance of interest in the political tragedy, and 
that it was written at the time when we have noticed a definite 
swing to conservatism in the diaries and letters (p. 15). Imme-
diately upon completing the play he writes in his diary98 that he 
counts it a great gain that he now understands the relation of the 
individual to the state as never before. This is an indication that 
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in the very act of working on the play his insight into the nature 
of the political tragedy deepened, perhaps that his point of view 
shifted. Very soon after completing the play he writes to Din-
gelstedt99 that his intention was to portray in the girl a being 
who evokes in the beholder a .sense of wonder that a thing of 
such purity and delicacy can have emerged from the inertness of 
common humanity ( ... eine Lilie hinzustellen, der man es auf 
jedem Blatt noch ansieht, dass sie sich durch den Boden hindurch 
qualen musste ... ) , and in the duke a stainless representative of 
the highest power, who merely by exhibiting the sublime concep-
tion of duty subdues rebellious passion. Indeed, Hebbel came so 
deeply under the spell of his conception of the exalted position of 
the state that he could write to Friedrich Uechtritz106 that he was 
completely on the side of the old duke and that it was the char-
acter of the duke that had aroused his interest in the whole 
subject. This does not, however, agree with a diary entry101 from 
the time when he was just beginning the work of composing the 
play. Then he wrote that it seemed as though the subject of Agnes 
Bernauer had just been made to order for the idea which he had 
had for a long time of representing beauty in its tragic aspect, 
as being fatal through its mere existence. From an entry in hi,.s 
diaries102 made a little over six years previously we know some-
thing about the shape which the tragedy of love and beauty took 
in his mind in the early stages. There he outlines the idea as the 
story of a very beautiful girl who has spent her first years in a 
cloister. Upon leaving it in complete ignorance of the inflamma-
tory nature of her beauty she has the experience that wherever she 
goes she evokes passion and discord: rivals for her love hate 
each other, other women are jealous of her because even without 
intent or awareness she estranges them from their lovers. Finally, 
when the brother of the man she loves begins to plot his death, 
she is seized with terror of herself and seeks sanctuary in the 
cloister once more. The idea for the tragedy of love and beauty 
just outlined is characteristic of Hebbel and could well have been 
the basis of a different sort of tragedy, in which the heroine 
through her disastrous experiences attains an insight into the 
nature of her sin of individuation and, thereby, the kind of meta-
physical reconciliation with the Adversary before death which 
Genoveva attains: the tragedy of beauty might thus have been a 
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kind of repetition of the tragedy of saintliness. It is very inter-
esting that about eleven years after the completion of Agnes 
Bernauer the original notion of the tragedy of love and beauty 
seemed to predominate in Hebbel's own evaluation of the play. 
He writes to Sigmund Englander103 that he never considered it 
a social drama, but that the Augsburg barber-surgeon's daughter 
always seemed so remarkable to him because her fate showed 
that the mere inactive existence of extreme beauty is by itself 
enough to set off a tragic conflict and that, therefore, in order to 
portray such a situation he had to make use of all the historical 
trappings. Thus it is at least interesting to contemplate the 
possibility that Hebbel was fundamentally interested in the 
tragedy of love and beauty and that the subject itself as well as 
Hebbel's growing sense of the value of tradition stimulated his 
interest in the political tragedy, with the resulting lack of unity 
that we have noted. This lack of unity has been noted by others, 
chiefly Heinrich Meyer-Benfey,104 whose analysis and strictures, 
while over-severe and exhibiting a militant political liberalism, 
are penetrating and revealing. But it does not seem possible 
to accept his thesis that the artistic failings of the play are due 
to the fact that Hebbel identified himself with whatever charac-
ters, Albrecht and Agnes, or Ernst, he happened to be portray-
ing. 105 However, the rift in conception that Meyer-Benfey 
exposes cannot be overlooked and is not really concealed by 
interpretations such as that of von Wiese,106 which seeks to find 
the unity of the play in the tension between the tragedy of love 
and beauty and the political tragedy, which reveals a metaphysical 
rift in the Deity, or that of Hans M. Wolff,1°7 who finds the unity 
in the figure of Albrecht as the pioneer representative of a new 
and better social order, a view which can find no support in the 
way Hebbel has organized his material, as, indeed, Wolff finally 
admits. Albrecht does have a certain unifying function in con-
necting the two tragedies, however, but it is not as the champion 
of progress. Still, it is probably necessary to come to the con-
clusion that the nuclei of two separate plays are more or less 
incompletely fused in Agnes Bernauer: on the one hand, the 
tragedy of love and beauty, which, following Hebbel's original 
impulse, might have come about as the result of civil war arising 
from rival claims to the th~one which a child of Agnes could not 
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legitimately occupy, and the tragedy of an incorruptible but 
human representative of the state, whose higher duty compels 
him to sacrifice what he holds most dear, even, by provoking war 
with his son, run the risk of losing both son and throne in order 
to keep them. Duke Ernst is a tragic character in scarcely a 
less degree than Agnes herself and if there is an esoteric unity 
in the play it lies probably in the circumstance that both Agnes 
and Ernst are crushed by the same Adversary, the one in defeat, 
the other in victory. 
The parallel of Agnes with Genoveva is quite plain and, up 
to a point, consistent: in Genoveva, perfect saintliness, in Agnes, 
perfect beauty of both body and soul. What Albrecht says of 
her, that no man can look at her without incurring extreme 
danger108 seems to be literally true: all the men of her own social 
circle from Theobald, her father's apprentice, to the superan-
nuated Knippeldollinger are in love with her and she has no 
friends left among the girls of her own age. But Agnes arouses 
all these conflicting desires, hates, and jealousies without intend-
ing to do so, and, so genuine is her innocence that, when she is 
made aware of what has happened, her first impulse is to stay 
out of sight. The love which she and Albrecht feel for each other 
is spontaneous and absolute and permits of no compromises: 
neither one can tolerate the thought of an illicit relationship, 
and for each life without the other would be meaningless. Thus, 
as soon as Agnes and Albrecht have seen each other the threat 
of tragedy is invoked: the choice is between a life cancelled by 
renunciation and a marriage which challenges the established 
order of the state. If Albrecht and Agnes follow Ernst upon the 
throne of Mtinchen-Bayern the result will be a long and bloody 
struggle for succession with the rival duchies of lngolstadt and 
Landshut. There seems to be a way out, which Ernst chooses 
when he excludes Albrecht from the succession and names his 
nephew Adolph instead, but the metaphysical experiment fails: 
The collateral line of Mtinchen-Bayern becomes extinct and the 
Adversary, after a respite of a brief two and a half years,109 al-
lows the fatal sequence of cause and effect to unfold. The instru-
ment of execution, drawn up by the best jurists of the time, is 
now upon the death of Adolph readied for Ernst's signature. 
Before affixing his signature Ernst calls upon Preising to decide 
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whether it is possible to save Agnes. Preising, who is shocked 
that Agnes must die only because she is beautiful and good,110 
is compelled to assent, but nevertheless takes it upon himself to 
hold open to Agnes one avenue of escape, namely that she re-
pudiate her marriage. It is an avenue that she cannot take, since 
repudiation would brand as iniquitous her holiest possession. 
Thus Agnes is compelled by the perfection of her soul to choose 
submission to a sentence of death which had to be pronounced 
only because she did not shave her head and take the veil, m and 
the great Juggernaut passes over her.112 Unlike Genoveva, how-
ever, Agnes does not attain an insight into her relation to the 
Adversary; in fact, she has no conscious relation to the Adver-
sary whatever: she is the pure individual and her tragic focus is 
her entire being with its mysterious freedom. 
Albrecht's tragedy is in its inception somewhat similar to the 
tragedy of Agnes: the imperious demands for individual ful-
fillment sweep aside any awareness of counter-demands imposed 
upon the individual by the universal forces. Albrecht's tragic 
focus is a love for Agnes so absolute that it makes him place his 
personal rights above the rights of his future subjects and he 
thus, unlike Agnes, who is passive, comes into active opposition 
to the Idea, going even so far as to head an army of rebellion. 
But no sooner has he taken his father prisoner than the act of 
tragic reconciliation begins to take place: an imperial herald 
and a papal legate begin to read ban and excommunication over 
him in the presence of the old duke, whose nobility of spirit has 
begun to reassert its claim to Albrecht's veneration. When Ernst 
talks to him of the duty which his high lineage has imposed upon 
him and promises him that full honors will be done Agnes as 
his deceased duchess, Albrecht bows to him as head of the state 
and representative of the emperor, but when Ernst gives him 
the ducal sceptre with the power to rule and the duty to sit in 
judgment upon his father after one year, Albrecht sinks to his 
knees before his father in token that he has experienced the 
tragic reconciliation. 
Albrecht is the link between the tragedy of love and beauty 
and the political tragedy and, as such, prevents the play from 
falling apart. Through him the political tragedy is connected 
with the tragedy of love and beauty, which is thus made to con-
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tribute to the conservative tendency of the drama as a whole, 
to which many passages from Hebbel's diaries and letters, ~s 
already cited, attest. Duke Ernst, although he is the completely 
justified representative of the universal forces, 113 is no more 
immune to tragedy than Agnes or Albrecht. He is compelled to 
require the death of a person of whose personal innocence he is 
just as convinced as is his chancellor, Preising. In so doing he 
must inflict upon his own son an injury so keen that there is 
doubt in his mind whether Albrecht can survive, and he rejoices 
when Albrecht takes up arms against him, for this is a sign that 
rage has triumphed over despair and that Albrecht will not suc-
cumb to his grief .114 He has resorted to these extreme measures 
in order to save what he has dedicated his life to and he goes 
even further, taking the step which Assad took but Herodes 
could not take: he gives up what he most cherishes-and him-
self too-in order to save it. Surrendering the ducal sceptre to 
Albrecht he knows that he is nearly broken by his experiences 
and by entering the monastery he anticipates death in its es-
sentials. This step, too, is necessary for the complete and final 
triumph of the Idea which he represents, for it is this step which 
breaks the last remaining trace of resistance in Albrecht. The 
play exhibits the vindication and victory of conservative social 
forces. The form of the Idea which Ernst represents, unlike the 
prevailing form of the Idea in Maria Magdalene, at no point 
shows signs of turning rigid and lifeless. Indeed, far from de-
stroying individual forms in its realization, it fosters and extends 
the possibilities of life for individual forms: it safeguards the 
life and happiness of myriads of nameless individuals.115 Albrecht 
and Agnes experience tragedy because their love constitutes a 
challenge to the Adversary. Ernst, the instrument used by the 
Adversary to counter the challenge, triumphs insofar as he is 
identified with the Idea, but very nearly cracks under the strain 
of use. 
The same kind of tragic process by which Albrecht achieves 
the metaphysical basis for morality through an insight into the 
relation of individual to Idea is represented in Gyges und sein 
Ring,116 a play which upholds the eternal rights of ethical con-
vention and tradition,117 and is therefore in accord with the ten-
dency to conservatism which marks the closing years of Hebbel's 
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life (p. 15). According to a letter written to Uechtritz,118 how-
ever, Hebbel was not conscious, while working on this play, as 
he was during the composition of the previous plays, of a cer-
tain background of ideas which framed the landscape, as he 
says, like a mountain-range; but he was fascinated merely by 
the story, which seemed so suitable for treatment as a tragedy, 
and only when the play was completed did he become aware of 
the idea of ethical convention as its central and governing idea. 
This judgment is borne out by a reading of the play itself, though 
it centers less upon the plot than the characters. No longer do 
the background factors of time and place determine the action, 
even the thoughts of the characters, as is true in Herodes und 
Mariamne, but they provide only a certain circumambienoe in 
which the action is more or less fortuitously imbedded. How 
fortuitously can be seen from the fact that the relation Rhodope, 
Kandaules, Gyges has already been encountered in Hebbel's work 
in many places, with many variations, and more or less com-
pletely: Judith, Holofernes; Genoveva, Siegfried, 'Golo; Klara, 
Leonhard-Anton, Friedrich; Julia, Tobaldi-Antonio, Bertram; 
Mariamne, Herodes, Soemus. The essential relations of the char-
acters to one another and to the central idea, the idea of ethical 
convention, are not bound to any point in space and time, as 
Hebbel well knew.119 The play presents a "timeless" problem, 
therefore one that can be considered modern as well as histori-
cal, in the costume of a semi-historical period that permits and 
makes credible the particular form of a more general conflict,120 
which reveals the relation of the individual to the idea of ethical 
convention. The culpable act of Kandaules which sets the tragic 
forces in motion and leads to the fatal conflict is consistent with 
the attitude of the Homeric Age toward woman: Helen passes 
from one possessor to another without diminishing in value or 
desirability; the Kandaules of Herodotus' story has the same 
attitude towards his wife as the owner of a valuable property 
which he feels he must exhibit to be sure of its worth.121 Thus, 
Kandaules' act is conceivable only in such a setting, but its con-
sequences and implications reach beyond the particular time 
and place, even into the realm of metaphysical universals. 
It is the idea, not the specific form, of ethical convention which 
is central to the play,122 and it is Rhodope, who has been in her 
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chaste seclusion its unreflecting embodiment, leading a flower-
like existence at her father's court in India, where, sitting under-
neath a pfane-tree with a lily in her hand,123 she seems to have 
been scarcely differentiated from the world which produced her. 
In a way she has been able to transfer her homeland to Lydia : 
she never leaves the palace and its gardens even when she might 
do so without reproach ;124 her veil, which she has worn at all 
times except when alone with her maidens or her husband125 is 
a part of her being ;12G the doom decreed a dishonored woman, 
which made her shudder as a child, although it signifies her own 
death, she acknowledges as right, unable to endure the sin, 
though innocently committed, 127 of being known by more than 
one man.128 Merely the removal from India to Lydia in marriage 
has signified a threat to her harmony of soul, because Kandaules, 
the rationalist, has been unable to muster up the proper rever-
ence for the tradition in which she was nurtured and has tried 
to make her lay aside the veil,129 but she has, until the moment 
of self-estrangement, maintained herself in an integral rela-
tion with herself and with her tradition.130 This integral rela-
tion, which has hitherto constituted her life, is broken by Kan-
daules' introduction of Gyges into the bed-chamber by means of 
the magic ring which disembodies the wearer. By a twist of the 
ring Gyges makes himself momentarily visible to Rhodope, who 
is thenceforth no longer at one with herself and the Adversary 
who has allowed her to be stricken by the primal curse.131 She 
feels that the mysterious breach between herself and the univer-
sal pmver, the sin of individuation, must be closed by her orwn 
death which she awaits from K?ndnulesY2 Ka11daules, trying 
to convince her that her fears are groundless, pushes assurance 
too far, revealing that Gyges is about to depart, and thus makes 
Rhodope surmise not only that Gyges was the intruder but also 
that Kandaules suspects this and wishes to shield him. Rhodope 
now sets out to secure expiation for the violation of the idea of 
ethical convention, from which she has been so far removed that 
she discards her veil as having lost its meaning.133 Her actions 
do not take her back to a harmonious relation to the universal 
forces but separate her from them more and more, so that by 
a bitter paradox, through seeking atonement for an injury which, 
although done to her as a woman, strikes against all nature,131 
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she grows to be less the representative and instrument of the 
Idea, as was Duke Ernst, and more the unique individual, ex-
posed to peculiar dangers and temptations. The retribution she 
first demands is murder and has no semblance to justice or the 
impersonal necessity to which Ernst reluctantly bowed,135 and 
she must even admit to Gyges that his nobility of spirit and his 
understanding of her have evoked a response,136 so that she has 
now doubly fallen from grace, once as the unwitting victim of 
her husband's insensitivity and now through personal attraction 
to a man who is not her husband. To the metaphysical guilt of 
being so peculiarly perfect an embodiment of the ethical idea 
that her existence as a woman necessarily exposed her to defile-
ment is added the personal guilt of unfaithfulness, though mere-
ly of inclination, to her husband. This double estrangement from 
her elemental nature leaves her only one resource: by marrying 
Gyges to restore the state of chastity in which she is known only 
by her husband, m and then by taking her life to atone for her 
unfaithfulness to Kandaules, to whom she would grant the re-
lease of oblivion while denying it to herself.138 
Kandaules wins the right to oblivion, that is, reconciliation 
with the universal forces, by undergoing a tragic experience 
through which he is enabled to comprehend his relation to the 
uniYerse, attaining the wisdom which wipes out all unjustified 
egotism and frees the spirit from death by anticipating it in the 
essentials.139 But his fate is not as tragic as the incomprehensible 
estrangement of Rhodope from the Idea which sustained her or 
the absolute isolation of Gyges, who through one unwitting mis-
step encompasses the death of his dearest friend and of the only 
woman he can love. For them tragedy results from their simple 
existence as woman and as man, and has no connection with the 
specific tendency of their will to existence, which is, actually, in 
conformity with the universal principle. But for Kandaules trag-
edy springs from a personal will which is contrary to the uni-
versal principle, or the idea of ethical convention. Rhodope has 
to begin with no tragic focus, her original guilt is existential; 
Gyges' tragic focus lies in a heedless deviation from what he 
feels to be right; but Kandaules' tragic focus is an actual guilt 
and is connected with the specific tendency of his will to exis-
tence. His death is a conscious expiation of what he has done,140 
a k~ov.·ing restoration of the harmony he has destroyed.141 
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The early scenes of the play show Kandaules as a naive ratio-
nalist, who insists upon discarding the insignia of royalty which 
have been venerated for half a millenium in Lydia,142 because he 
wants a sword that can be brandished handily indoors143 and a 
crown that fits his head and serves as a mounting for the prec-
ious stones that are found or will be found in his kingdom.144 His 
reaction upon accepting the mysterious and awful ring of in-
visibility i.s to try it out,145 as, of course, he immediately does, 
overhearing the conversation of discontented subjects and viola-
ting the sanctuary of Rhodope's slave-girls. He has never been 
able to acknowledge the symbolic meaning of Rhodope's veil,146 
and tries to induce her to appear at the games without it because 
it is difficult for him to have faith in a value which is not patent 
to everyone, susceptible of being tested, weighed, and meas-
ured.147 He is so dependent upon testing, weighing, and measur-
ing that it has seemed to Rhodope that he needed others' envy 
of his good fortune to feed the flame of his love.148 He has the 
positivist's fiundamental fault, lack of the capacity for reverence, 
which in his case becomes his tragic focus. His defiance of tradi-
tion, however, does not constitute a serious attempt to institute 
revolutionary changes. He does not try or threaten to tear up 
the paving blocks of society, but is merely unable to believe in 
any value beyond the actual positive worth of a thing. He is not 
in advance of his time, indeed, in one respect he shows himself 
to represent a less advanced position than Rhodope. It will be 
recalled that in Herodes 'Ui'.nd Mariamne the principle of oriental 
despotism with its cynical use of human beings to satisfy whim 
or desire is embodied in the old form of the Idea as represented 
by Herodes, whereas Mariamne, with her demand for the sanct-
ity of the individual represents a new form, destined eventually 
to triumph. The relation of Mariamne to Herodes is closely 
analogous to the relation of Rhodope to Kandaules, whose action 
in revealing her to Gyges is consistent with the Homeric attitude 
toward women.149 Nowhere in the play is there an indication 
that Kandaules planned any reforms comparable to the reforms 
which Herodes planned. Not lacking in strength or courage,150 
he seems to lack the resolution that comes from conviction,151 
so that enemies of the country are encouraged to attack in the 
belief that they can do so with impunity.152 His inertia, together 
with his skepticism of traditional and transcendent values, does, 
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indeed, arouse the resentment of his subjects, who wish to force 
him to resume his inherited emblems of authority, and Gyges' 
victory at the games makes him seem so ineffectual that there 
is some popular desire to depose him and eleyate Gyges to his 
place.153 
In Kandaules' situation as just outlined there is nothing which 
is necessarily tragic. In fact, if this were the entire picture it 
would have to be said that he was not sufficiently imposing in 
stature to be tragic and that his own comparison of himself to 
an insect that tried to change the world154 would be quite just. 
It is even conceivable that the insect-pricks he inflicted would 
have passed unheeded. Kandaules' tragic experience stems not so 
much from his lack of reverence for the symbols of state as from 
his lack of reverence for the sanctity of the individual as im-
bedded in traditional moral faith. His positivist skepticism of 
transcendent values made him unable to see in Rhodope's veil 
anything more than a piece of material that kept her beauty and 
his good fortune from being apparent to everyone, made him 
share the guilt of so many of Hebbel's heroes and, \be it said 
parenthetically, of Hebbel himself, to violate the sanctity of per-
sonality in a woman. Here Kandaules takes upon himself the ori-
ginal metaphysical guilt of sex, the primeval dualism with its 
attendant misunderstanding, injustice, egotistical exploitation. 
The right of the veil which Kandaules disregards, the conven-
tional morality he flaunts, are the defenses of woman and of 
womanhood against desecration by man. Kandaules, in becoming 
aware of his relation to the great dualistic principle, also comes 
to understand the transcendent significance of convention and 
tradition, the conservative social values, which it was death for 
him to violate,155 and he submits in full consciousness of what he 
has done and why his life is forfeit. He understands that by em-
ploying the ring for mere personal ends, he has challenged awe-
some, mystic forces,156 and that the principle of ethical conven-
tion cannot be flaunted with impunity. The forms in which the 
principle is manifest may change, indeed, they must,157 but they 
stand for something that exacts acknowledgment.158 The un-
questioning, unknowing adherence of the world to these forms 
gives it health and strength in a refreshing sleep.159 Crowns, 
rusty swords, and veils are the baubles to which it clings in sleep 
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and which Kandaules tries to take away. But the officious in-
truder, like an ineffectual insect, is brushed aside by the sleeping 
giant's careless hand. 
Gyges is in every respect, save nobility of character, a trait 
which Kandaules, who refuses to allow Gyges to sacrifice him-
self, 160 also possesses, the opposite of his beloved friend. His sen-
sitivity gives him a quick and ready sympathy for Thoas' feel-
ings, injured by Kandaules' abrupt insistence upon appearing 
at the games attired in modern, functional regalia.161 It is an em-
pathic grasp of what another holds dear, but it does not stop 
there: having come into involuntary possession of the ring of 
invisibility, although he discovered the advantageous use to 
which it could be put, he wished to return it to the grave where 
he found it,162 out of reverence for forces which he finds incom-
prehensible. Even in acquiescing to Kandaules' insistence that 
he use the ring to convince himself of Rhodope's peerless beauty, 
he shows reverence for what he does not understand, protesting 
that Kandaules' proposal must dishonor anyone but particularly 
a woman like Rhodope.163 In the very moment of committing the 
deed he realizes that he has defiled a woman's soul, and he twists 
the ring upon his finger in order to be discovered and provoke 
retribution for his desecration.164 When he meets K!andaules the 
following day his sense of having done wrong has, if anything, 
grown keener, and he urges Kandaules to accep,t the sacrifice or 
his life in expiation.165 The fact that Gyges is quite the opposite 
of Kandaules is sensed by the Lydians, who are first impressed 
by his prowess in the traditional games of Hercull:)s,166 desire him 
to be their king,rn7 and, indeed, upon Kandaules' death, acclaim 
him as such.168 
In every particular and at every time save one Gyges is iden-
tified with the conservative and ethical forces as represented by 
the Lydian people in their spokesman Thoas and by Rhodope. At 
every point except one he upholds the principle of ethical con-
vention which triumphs and survives in him. The one minor 
but crucial failure through which he suffers tragedy is charac-
teristic of Hebbel's view that the individual, merely because he 
is such, must find himself in a critical relation to the Whole. It 
is not only Kandaules who is involved in the metaphysical guilt 
of sex, the primal principle of differentiation. Gyges has hitherto 
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known woman only under the aspect of motherhood, 169 but his 
curiosity and desires are quickened by the sight of Lesbia at the 
games, and Kandaules feeds the fire of his imagination by de-
scribing Leshia's beauty which is hidden by her veil.170 Thus, 
although he knows that what he is about to do is wrong, his moral 
sense is numbed by the powerful impulse to come closer to the 
mystery of woman, his resistance is easily broken by Kandaules, 
who points out that the ring will shield them from detection. It 
needs but the sight of Rhodope to transform egocentric desire 
and curiosity into a pure love, the first concern of which is the 
beloved. He feels that because women had been a mystery to 
him, he had stretched out his hand for something he desired but 
crushed it, just as a boy will crush the bird he wants to stroke; 
so he has killed the only thing in the world that could be precious 
to him.171 He suffers a tragedy as great or perhaps greater than 
Kandaules and Rhodope : not only does he in the moment of 
seeing Rhodope become ready for death, because he understands 
that everything life has to off er him has already passed into the 
possession of someone else,172 but also, in order to try to save 
Rhodope's life he must challenge his dearest friend to mortal 
combat. But even slaying Kandaules does not save Rhodope, and 
Gyges is left in complete isolation. In all essentials he antici-
pates death fully as much as Kandaules, only for him the recon-
ciliation with the universal powers is not so complete, since he 
does not gain the oblivion of death. Thus, as we have already 
seen in the case of Judith, Genoveva, Duke Ernst, and Rhodope, 
the individual who is in accord with the universal forces and 
through whose agency those powers triumph, is peculiarly ex-
posed to tragedy. In Gyges und sein Ring each main character, 
whether opposed to or in the service of conservative social forces, 
acquiesces to his or her tragic destiny in order that these con-
servative social forces be upheld. 
The Nibelungen, 173 Hebbel's last completed work, consisting 
of two five- act plays, Siegfrieds Tod and Kriemhilds Rache, and 
a one-act prologue, Der gehornte Siegfried, is in this respect the 
antithesis of Gyges und sein Ring, being plainly progressive in 
its tendency. As he writes to Marie, Princess Wittgenstein,174 
it was his intention to show a new world emerging from a back-
ground of early Germanic and Christian elements. In fact, three 
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years later, writing to Pastor Luck,175 he says that his trilogy 
shows the triumph of Christianity over heathendom. To this 
end there are throughout the play allusions to a myth which 
Hebbel devised and put in the mouth of Dietrich von Bern in a 
scene which he later eliminated,176 thereby creating an atmos-
phere of greater mystery. According to this myth, every thou-
sand years there comes the possibility that a superman will be 
begotten, a giant who derives his colossal strength from all 
nature. If this happens, the dead gods will create a bride for 
him, who, if they marry, will produce a race that will destroy 
humanity. But the ordinary race of mortals has also one chance 
to survive through producing a rival bride: if the superman 
chooses the human bride the danger is averted. At such a mo-
ment in history the world, shaken to its depths, changes form : 
the past struggles up out of its grave, the future strives to be 
born, and the present strives to def end itself. Siegfried, of 
course, is the superman, Brunhild, the supernatural bride, and 
Kriemhild, her human rival. Siegfried, Brunhild, Frigga, and 
the ancient Norse gods represent a primordial and proto-human 
stage of cosmic evolution; most of the other characters, despite 
their nominal Christianity,177 represent a stage of heathendom, 
with the absolute ethical norms of personal bravery, fealty, and 
particularly revenge; the chaplain, Riideger, and Dietrich von 
Bern represent the new form of the Idea or Christianity, with its 
ethical norms of self-control, humility, readiness to forgive. 
On the level of the individual the antagonists are, first, Sieg-
fried and Hagen, and then, Hagen and Kriemhild. Seen against 
the mythic background, these conflicts signify the successful self-
defense of humanity against the might of dragons and dragon-
killers, who cannot be distinguished one from the other,178 and 
the inevitable self-destruction of a society whose highest law is 
vengeance. But a consideration of how the conflict is worked 
out makes it clear that here as elsewhere in Hebbel's drama the 
essential antagonism is not between man and man but between 
Adversary and individual. Siegfried is the instrument of one 
manifestation of the universal forces and Hagen, of another. 
Siegfried, by bathing in the dragon's blood, has made himself in-
vulnerable and thus put himself outside the pale of humanity, 
for, as Hagen clearly recognizes, his supernatural powers remove 
from him the moral right to enter into combat with ordinary 
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mortals,179 who must exterminate him by fair means or foul 
along with other monsters.180 Although Hagen is, indeed, re-
sentful of the only hero he has met who can surpass him and 
who, moreover, shows a sovereign disdain for the courage and 
accomplishments of other men, 181 he knows and admits that 
Siegfried won his sword, his treasure, and his cap of invisibility 
through valor and strength.182 These heroic deeds, particularly 
the bath in the dragon's blood which completes his superhuman 
attributes, making him invulnerable, except for a small spot 
between the shoulders, and also capable of understanding the 
language of the birds, are necessary steps in the supernatural 
design to bring Siegfried to Brunhild.183 But Siegfried is not 
only a pawn of the ancient gods, he is also an individual, with 
personal preferences and desires: standing invisible at the edge 
of the lake of fire that died down when he brandished his sword, 
he sees Brunhild appear on the parapets of her castle, knows 
that he cannot love her, and goes away without revealing him-
self.184 His purely human nobility becomes the tragic focus 
which lets destructive forces in upon himself and all the others. 
From this follows the wooing of Kriemhild, the subduing of 
Brunhild to Gunther's wishes (the characteristic Hebbelian 
primeval guilt of sex) ; there follows then the revelation of his 
deed to Kriemhild, the quarrel of the queens, Brunhild's disgraee. 
And now Hagen comes forward to kill the giant, whose mere 
existence has brought the entire society of the Burgundians to 
the brink of disaster. Hagen knows that no blame can accrue 
to Siegfried for revealing the deception practised on Brunhild,185 
but he also knows that the injury done his queen and king is 
mortal.186 Volker, too, knows that revelation of the deed is 
merely a misfortune, but one that leaves the Burgundians only 
with the possibility of choosing who is to die, Brunhild or Sieg-
fried. And so the deed is resolved upon, carried out with ruth-
lessness, and made known with brutality, and Hagen, whose code 
demands that even the suspicion of cowardice or dishonor be 
, atoned in blood, takes upon himself the guilt of a dishonorable 
deed to avenge the honor of his master's house. His dishonor is 
rooted in honor : in exacting mortal punishment for the trans-
gressions done against the form of society he represents, he com-
mits the fatal excess, and provokes the chain of terrible retribu-
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tion which ends only with the death of the last Burgundian and 
the promise of a new ethic to succeed the old. Thus the great 
antagonists, Siegfried, Hagen, Kriemhild, although they en-
compass each other's downfall and death are really defeated by 
the Adversary: Siegfried, the instrument of the old gods, be-
cause of his mysterious individual freedom sets going a series 
of causes and effects that necessarily lead from the failure of the 
attempt of the primordial past to come to life, to the bankruptcy 
of the fundamentally heathen present with its inevitable alterna-
tion of revenge and counter-revenge that can end only in self-
destruction, to the emergence of the Christian future. The 
embodiment of pagan ferocity, Etzel, when his wife Kriemhild 
has been killed at the last by the ancient Hildebrand, cannot take 
up the burden which devolves upon him as a heathen king, to 
judge, condemn, avenge, empty new streams into the sea of blood 
that has already flowed, but turns instead to the third of the 
mighty trio, Siegfried, Etzel, Dietrich, who symbolize the three 
contending forms of the Idea, 187 and asks Dietrich, the Christian, 
to step into his place and carry the world further in its progress. 
Approximately two years after he began work on the Nibel-
ungen Hebbel started a play, Demetrius, which he never fin-
ished.188 It deals with the same material that is the subject 
matter of the unfinished play, Demetrius, which Schiller was 
working on when he died, and, as is plainly evident from the 
fragments we possess, it was to deal with these materials in a 
profoundly conservative way. The central idea, the figure of the 
prince who has been brought up in ignorance of his identity, is 
one of Hebbel's earliest. According to a letter to Moritz Kolben-
heyer189 it goes back to his seventeenth year. Although this 
assertion has not been substantiated by other evidence, it does 
not seem unlikely, inasmuch as young people often indulge in 
the fantasy that they are not the natural children of their par-
ents, a fantasy that might very well have had great emotional 
significance for Hebbel, who, as we know from Emil Kuh's biog-
raphy and from his own letters and diaries, felt himself de-
meaned and denied his natural rights by the Kirchspielvogt Mohr, 
by whom he was employed from the time he was fourteen until 
he was twenty-two. The Demetrius of the prologue, tormented 
beyond endurance by the sense of being essentially far above his 
THE PLAYS 65 
menial position, can very well be taken as a reflection of the 
young Hebbel in the service of the man whose patronage both 
made his future life possible and also, at least in Hebbel's view, 
brutally disregarded his personal qualities. Be this as it may, 
it is certain that the theme of the unsuspecting prince was in his 
mind when he was twenty-five: a diary entry for the nineteenth 
of March, 1838,190 mentions it as an excellent subject for a 
comedy. Three years later, the idea has expanded a bit and the 
diary entry for the twenty-first of January, 1841,191 speaks of 
the comic dilemma in which such a prince would find himself: 
whatever course of action he takes will probably be wrong. Eight 
years later still, in the diary entry for the tenth of February, 
1849,192 the comic aspect of the theme has disappeared and the 
situation as it is essentially at the beginning of the play is out-
lined: a prince who has been brought up in obscurity and in 
ignorance of his origin commits a murder, but just as the law is 
about to exact the penalty it is revealed that he is above the law. 
It can thus be seen that when Hebbel's attention was directed to 
the Demetrius theme by his interest in re-working Schiller's un-
completed play, he was taking up a problem that had long had 
considerable significance for him. Unfortunately, he did not 
live to complete the play and, even though he did finish over four 
acts in addition to the prologue it is not at all clear how the de-
nouement would have come about. None the less, enough of the 
play exists in a sufficiently finished form to allow certain con-
clusions as to its general tendency. The fifth act, of which two 
hundred thirty lines were written, could not conceivably have 
been intended to reverse and nullify everything that had pre-
ceded and therefor,e it would seem that the play must be admitted 
in evidence and given its due weight.193 · 
The background, which Hebbel considered particularly impor-
tant in this play,194 is the Slavic domains of Russia and Poland 
at the time of the usurper Boris Godunow,195 who is a minor 
character in the play and is given very sympathetic treatment. 
Demetrius is the son of the late Czar Ivan the Terrible and a 
palace-servant, born at the same time as a legitimate son of Ivan 
and Marfa Nagoy. The Jesuits, in order to install a czar who 
will open the Russian Empire to the Roman Church, believe they 
have persuaded the palace-servant Barbara to steal the new-born 
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prince, leaving her own son, of whose paternity they are igno~ 
rant, in place of the legitimate heir. Barbara, however, deceives 
the Jesuits and turns over to them her own son, who she can 
truthfully swear is the child of Ivan. The true prince is killed 
and thus with Ivan, who has murdered another son with his own 
hands, comes to an end the line of Russian rulers whose legiti-
mate descent from Rurik constitutes their absolute right to the 
throne. The illegitimate son of Ivan, Demetrius, has grown up 
in Poland as a kind of half menial, half foster-child, of Mniczek, 
the woiwod or governor of Sendomir. He has a natural majesty, 
an inborn power to command respect and obedience, an over-
whelming sense of having nothing in common with the other 
servants of the household and of being superior even to his 
master and the Polish nobles, who are Mniczek's associates. His 
impossible position is especially poignant because he is in love 
with Mniczek's daughter Marina, who is socially so far above him 
that his love is both hopeless and inordinately presumptuous. 
When the play opens with the prologue the pressure of resent-
ment against the fact that every natural expression of his per-
sonality is illegitimate has reached the point where a violent 
explosion can be set off by almost any incident. This incident is 
provoked by the attempt of the nobleman Odowalski to rebuke 
and chastise him for being too familiar with Marina. Demetrius 
challenges Odowalski to a duel, a challenge which Odowalski 
quite naturally ignores, since Demetrius is not a gentleman. 
Demetrius then rushes upon the defenseless Odowalski and 
murders him without compunction. Although committed in fury 
this act is not blind or senseless, but is instead a kind of attempt 
at suicide.196 As such it fails because the monk Gregory and 
the Cardinal-Legate come forward with the announcement that 
Demetrius is the legitimate heir to the throne of Russia and 
therefore above the law, an announcement which gives Demet-
rius for the first time the right to be his true self.197 This is a 
right, however, which he has gained through committing a mur-
der, which has as its most profound motive to challenge the social 
order to do away with him. The whole prologue serves as the 
setting for this murder, which puts into motion the tragic forces 
that have been poised for years. No more forceful dramatic 
emphasis could be given to the fact that Demetrius achieves self-
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realization through violent transgression and personal guilt. 
Not even his subsequent scrupulous regard for law, the popular 
welfare, and the principle of legitimacy can efface this. 
The principle of legitimacy is conceived as the absolute stand-
ard of this time and place: although the Russian nobles may 
conceal their personal motives under the cloak of allegiance to 
the principle,198 none the less, the principle is so absolute that 
the fate of two monarchs and their followers as well as the fate 
of the realm depends upon it. When Demetrius repeatedly risks 
his life from a feeling that he must not allow even the suspicion 
to rest upon him that he has less personal bravery than aniy 
soldier who fights for him, Mniczek points out that he must not 
suppose that nameless thousands are ready to sacrifice their lives 
for him as an individual. Their sacrifice is offered to the prin-
ciple of imperial majesty, which he represents, and which has 
had from the beginning of time the right to let loose the powers 
of hell in order to subdue its foes. For just as certainly as the 
power of majesty alone has subdued diabolical powers, just as 
certainly does it have the right to unleash them in its defense 
when it is threatened.199 The right of a legitimate son of Ivan to 
assemble an army to depose Boris is universally accepted. The 
cardinal-legate counted upon this when he planned to have Ivan's 
son brought up outside Russia so as to use him as a tool to open 
the Russian Empire to the Roman Church and he is certain that 
all the peoples of Russia will gather around the battle-flags of 
the true heir.200 In fact, Boris himself, who had by no means 
been eager to claim the throne, says he would turn over his im-
perial sway to Demetrius if he could believe his claim to be 
valid. 201 Demetrius himself does believe it to be valid, partly 
because of the evidence of Gregory and the cardinal-legate but 
more because royal ancestry would explain to him the otherwise 
mysterious feeling of superiority which had given him so much 
torment because he had no right to it. Having suffered beyond 
endurance because of illegitimacy, he prizes legitimacy so much 
more, and by his very first decisions, to make no significant social 
changes within the empire without the advice of his legal coun-
sellors,202 prepares us for a decision to renounce his claim and 
even life itself when he learns that, even though he is Ivan's son, 
he is not the rightful prince because his mother was not the 
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czarina: for him his claim is valid only as long as it is legiti-
mate.2os 
From what has been said so far it might seem as though Heb-
bel's characteristic feeling that tragedy is inherent in the rela-
tionship of the significant individual to the Whole is absent from 
Demetrius: the exciting cause of the tragedy is a crime commit-
ted by the hero. And it is true that real personal guilt con-
tributes a great deal to the tragic experience of the two charac-
ters who are the central tragic figures: Demetrius and his sup-
posed mother Marfa. None the less, for both of them, tragedy 
comes because their actions, springing from what they are, con-
stitute the fatal excess. Any action on their part must lead to 
doom and the only possibility of avoiding it lies in taking no 
action whatever, that is, surrender and negation of self. Marfa, 
the widow of Czar I van, has gone into involuntary retirement 
in a cloister204 but has become reconciled to her life there and 
has, in fact, nearly attained the degree of self-abnegation which 
brings reconciliation with the Idea by anticipating death in the 
essentials,205 desiring to live longer only to complete her purifica-
tion and the atonement of her great wrong-doing.206 She has 
been broken by contrition for the terrible vengeance which she 
visited on the guilty and the innocent alike for the death of her 
child.207 Her tragic focus lay in the fact of being the czarina, 
for the crown doubles the power of the demons that tempt, and 
halves the power of the angels that warn: had she been no dif-
ferent from other mothers, she would at most have killed her-
self. 208 This woman is once more and against her will made to 
participate in affairs of state: Hiob, the patriarch, wishes her 
to go to Moscow to pray at the tomb of the murdered child, thus 
giving evidence that the real Demetrius is dead, but Otrepiep, 
the unprincipled and despicable adventurer, takes her to Demet-
rius' camp in order to reap a reward for having strengthened 
the latter's claims. She goes to Demetrius, hoping for a sign, 
for positive intuitional knowledge whether he is her son or not, 
but the sign for which she has implored heaven is not given. 
Demetrius' resemblance to I van makes her think that he must be 
ber son, but she has no certainty. But, having no inner convic-
tion that Demetrius is an impostor, she does not denounce him 
and thereby ·even aids him, for her apparent acceptance of him 
give~ widespread credence to his claim and gains him many fol-
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lowe.:s. Marfa, unable to endure the heavy responsibility of 
being the cause of so many warriors perishing in the struggle 
with Boris seeks certainty at the tomb of the child in Moscow. 
But meanwhile she has been deeply moved by Demetrius' nobility 
and goodness so that the wish that he might be the true prince 
suppresses her inner voice until the moment when Mniczek, for 
political reasons, orders the removal of the casket from the royal 
tomb. Then, within hearing of the assembled citizens of Moscow 
she cries "No!" and the abbess, who has been her companion, 
knows that she has obtained intuitional certainty.20° Coming 
thus publicly, her knowledge must have the most serious conse-
quences for Demetrius, for the people are very readily swayed 
by rumors and reports, and this time they see an action which 
can have only one meaning: that the new czar is an impostor. 
Marfa, convinced of Demetrius' nobility of character, tries to 
eounteract what has happened by bestowing a public blessing 
upon Demetrius, but she cannot bless him as being the rightful 
heir, but only as deserving happiness because of his greatne/8s 
and nobility. These scenes constitute the climax of the play: at 
this point it becomes clear to the spectators that Demetrius' 
claim is false, and the rest of the play must set forth how the 
truth is revealed to Demetrius (the magnificent fourth act) and 
how he meets his fate. Marfa, by emerging from the half-death 
of the cloister and once more taking part in the great event3 
of history, merely by virtue of being what she is, the czarina, 
loses the hard-won and precarious tranquillity that was almost 
within her grasp and, contrary to her will, helps bring about the 
defeat and death of the only human being who commands her 
love and respect, the false Demetrius. 
Demetrius' tragic focus, the slaying of Odowalski, constitutes 
real personal guilt, but in a deeper sense this guilt is existential. 
The entry in Hebbel's diary will be recalled in which he wrote 
of the dilemma of the unsuspecting prince: whatever course of 
action he takes will be wrong. Demetrius, like every individual 
in Hebbel's view, is by nature illegitimate. In the prologue the 
conflict between his real and apparent nature has reached such 
a pitch of intensity that he longs for death and, as we have seen, 
murders Odowalski as a challenge to the society which has had 
no place for him. He is so absolute an individual that, unable to 
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endure the restraint put upon him by society, he prefers death 
to life, but, in seeking death, does what he can to strike at the 
universal forces which deny him the right to be himself. If he 
could have avoided guilt, it would have been through the sacri-
fice of his essential self. However, he asserts himself and through 
his self-assertion seems to gain the possibility and the right to 
live. But his new life is just as illegitimate as the old and is 
doomed to failure, no matter what he does: Marla's perception of 
the unwitting imposture must be fatal in any case. Demetrius, 
however, who has shown by every action since the revelation of 
his supposed descent, that he reveres established tradition and 
believes without reservation in the principle of legitimacy, will 
not fall an unwilling victim to the absolute forces. His great~st 
temptation comes just after Gregory reveals that he has the 
backing of the Roman Church, which has secreted him in order to 
secure acknowledgment in Russia through him. This means 
that Demetrius has the support of the Roman Church and the 
possibility of closing the ecclesiastical schism. Demetrius' reply 
is that he will never interfere with the divine order of things and, 
after Gregory has gone, that his people must be free to worship 
as they choose, decisions which he does not revoke when he learns 
from Marfa that he is only an illegitimate son of Ivan. It does 
not even occur to Demetrius to seek his allies where he can find 
them: his first impulse is to call the nobles together, reveal the 
truth, and seek their leave to return to Poland where the execu-
tioner will be waiting for him. Mniczek, however, is quick to 
point out that Demetrius cannot hope to avoid further guilt 
through this course of action either, for if he gives up now he 
will necessarily plunge Mniczek, Marina and all his other loyal 
followers to destruction. Demetrius understands this and thus 
resolves to impersonate the czar, sacrifice his peace of mind and 
conscience, until he can provide for the safety of his friends and 
then encompass his own destruction.210 The individual seeks 
tragic reconciliation with the absolute forces and dies in order to 
uphold them. Demetrius is uncompromisingly conservative. 
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"Ein Atmen iiber mir, als ob's mich einziehen will.-Alles Leben 
ist Raub des Einen am Anderen." Hebbel, Tagebiicher, 12. 
Marz 1841. 
"Du atmest fremden Tod als Dein Leben ein und fremdes Leben 
als Deinen Tod aus." Hebbel, Tagebiicher, 20. Marz 1857. 
"In dem Augenblick, wo das Elixier des ewigen Lebens entdeckt 
wird, konnen die Menschen nicht mehr zeugen-der Brunnen 
trocknet aus. Es stirbt Niemand mehr, es wird aber auch Niemand 
mehr geboren." Hebbel, Tagebiicher, 31. Mai 1844. 
It will be recalled how Hebbel's attitude toward the question 
of social change as revealed in his diaries, letters, and poems ' 
tended at one time to be progressive and at another to be con-
servative, alternating in an irregular rhythm between these two 
poles. And the same kind of alternation has been revealed in 
the plays. But whether he saw the cosmic process as an upward 
movement or as a mere oscillation, he saw it at all times as a 
flux, a never ceasing interaction of opposed forces, all life being 
the struggle of the individual against the Absolute. From the 
relatively early diary entry1 to the effect that the individual, eter-
nally in the process of being created, prevents the ;universe from 
terminating in rigidity to the very late one2 to the effect that 
nature has made the total life process dependent upon the meta-
bolic flow of individuals, just as the individual life process is de-
pendent upon the metabolic flow of basic substances, this notion 
of compact flux persists without fundamental change. For Hebbel 
this means that nothing essentially new can enter the universe, 
which must be a kind of closed system, but only that often aln 
element disappears at one place to reappear at another.3 The 
process is like the melting of an icicle : the water drips down and 
re-forms into ice below.4 Discovery of an elixir of life would 
be like a sudden freeze that prevented the upper icicle from 
dropping away: at the moment when an elixir of life should be 
discovered, human beings would no longer be able to beget chil-
dren, no one would die but no one would be born.5 The process 
of compact flux is in such perfect balance that no one can be born 
unless someone else has previously just died :6 you breathe in 
another's death as your life and you breathe out your own death 
as another's life.7 
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Hebbel's conception of the world has often been called a 
dualism and, indeed, he himself accepted dualism as the basic 
and ultimate principle: it dominates all our ideas and thoughts, 
making it possible for us to conceive of life and death, health 
and disease, time and eternity, but not to comprehend any uni-
fying and reconciling principle that is the ground of these an-
tagonisms. 8 He recognizes that Schelling's conception that at 
a certain time God the Son of necessity pr.oceeded from God the 
Father projects the fundamental dualism into the Deity, and 
makes God the root of the cosmic disunity.9 Humanity is irre-
vocably divided against itself by the primeval dualism, of which 
Jewry and heathendom in Judith are only represenltatives.10 
Fundamentally, the cosmic process seems to be one of complete 
estrangement to the point of hostility and then a self-reconcilia-
tion through love.11 Hate and love would therefore be designa-
tions of opposite universal tendencies: individuation involves its 
own punishment, so that universal hate has replaced universal 
love, which ought to prevail.12 But if it is true that universal 
love ought to prevail and that the cosmic process leads to a re-
conciliation through love, a single absolute principle seems to be 
implied, rather than two co-equal and opposed principles, which 
would seem necessary for a consistent dualism. And, indeed, 
Hebbel does speak of the aboriginal feeling of existence, higher 
than the tension of love and hate, a feeling with which God em-
braces the world.13 This leads to the conception of an all inclu-
sive Absolute or Whole, a differentiated monistic Absolute in 
compact flux, the dualism consisting in the mysterious diff eren• 
tiation and freedom of the individual from the Whole, or God. 
The antagonists in Hebbel's dualism are not the Devil and God, 
but man and God, who is the Adversary. 
"Man conceived his own opposite and he had his 'God."14 This 
is one of a considerable number of Hebbel's groping attempts to 
formulate his feeling about God. Another one is: "God is every-
thing, because he is nothing, nothing :finite."15 This pantheistic 
conception is very early in Hebbel: in July 1835 he notes in his 
diary16 that God is the essence of all power, physical as well as 
spiritual, even having sensual desires. Or again he conceives of 
God as an all-pervasive atmosphere in which the mind breathes 
and has its being just as the body has its being in the air, so that 
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every thought and every feeling is a breath of God.17 Or God is 
the self-consciousness of the world, analogous to the self-con-
sciousness of the individual; whether He exists or not, none can 
say, but it is certain that if He does not exist the world has no 
purpose.18 All manifestations of the finite are an irridescence 
of the One and Everlasting,19 and the world is a great wound in-
flicted upon God.20 The last figure occurs in a good many varia-
tions, being on~ of Hebbel's favorite metaphors for the relation 
of the individual to the Whoh~. For example, he writes that it 
would not be impossible that man's consciousness as an individual 
is a feeling of pain in the same sense that a finger or some othe,r 
member of the body becomes, so to speak, self-conscious, when 
it is injured and no longer has its normal relation to the whole 
organism.21 The elegiac distichs entitled "Das Urgeheim-
nis"22 rephrase this idea: "How does pain originate? Just as 
life does. If your finger hurts you, this means that the fifn&;er 
has been dissociated from the body and the juices are beginning 
to circulate in it independently. Thus the individual is only a 
pain in God." And the yearning for immortality is the smart of 
the wound that was caused when the individuals were torn away 
from the Whole, to begin separate existence, like the dissevered 
members of a polyp.23 At this point it begins to be plain that if, 
in Hebbel's view, God is the self-consciousness of the world and 
if the individual becomes aware only through the pain of separa-
tion from the Whole, there is an interdependence of individual 
and Absolute: the finite being is necessary for the liberation and 
self-realization of the Infinite Being or, as we have seen (p.73, 
above) the ceaseless emergence of individual forms prevents the 
Absolute from terminating in rigidity. At the same time, the 
individual forms, being finite, prevent a complete and perfect 
realization of the Absolute: the Deity is corseted by the created 
world24 and man is the Procrustes-bed of God.25 Therefore 
every process of thought is an effort of God to find Himself, thait 
would S1Ucceed much sooner if He did not also seek to lose Him-
self ;26 that is, the Absolute can be realized, although imperfectly, 
only in the individual forms, whose ultimate and highest destiny 
is to be reunited through submergence with the Absolute. Finite 
and infinite are interdependent: the Eternal must dream about 
the Temporal, just as the Temporal dreams about the Eternal.21 
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This interdependence goes so far that it occurs to Hebbel as a 
strange possibility that God may not have given birth to the 
world but the world to God.28 In the world a God lies buried, who 
seeks to be resurrected, to break through at every point, in love 
and in every noble deed.29 Therefore, if God the Creator doe3 
not exist, God the Creature is at least conceivable : if there is 
not a colossal Individual in the beginning, why not at the: ena ?·'" 
But these speculations are only extremely bold formulations of 
the basic interdependence of God and the world. Hebbel's usual 
and more sober belief postulated God as the originally undiff er-
entiated Whole, the greatest single Being, a sort of counter-
balance to the individual beings, into which it is constantly break-
ing up.31 However, as he wrote to Pastor Luck,32 on the stand-
point which the pastor represented there is certainty of a 
personal God and of immortality, but on Hebbel's own standpoint 
everything is a mystery and every attempt to solve the riddle of 
the universe is a tragedy of thought. 
But whatever the ultimate nature of the mystery, in Hebbel's 
view the basic concept is an Absolute which, through the prin-
ciple of individuation, consists of a myriad individual forms, 
whose existence depends upon the Absolute .but whose existence 
is just as necessary to the Absolute, which, but for them, must 
terminate in a static rigidity.33 As we know, a constant flux, an 
unceasing metabolic flow of individuals is necessary to bring life 
into this kind of universe, and it is on this basis that there is 
some justification for considering Hebbel's concept of the uni-
verse dualistic. However this may be, it is a concept which must 
spring from a particular sense of existence, a specific Lebens-
gefuhl. The pertinent passages in Hebbel's diaries and letters 
reveal a rather consistent intuitional and emotional orientation 
to questions of metaphysical import from early to late in life. 
To turn now from the monistic differentiated Absoliute under 
the aspect of the Whole, to the same Absolute under the aspect 
of the individual, we find there that the flux which gives life to 
the Whole means death to the individual forms, the disappear-
ance of one form being necessary for the emergence of another. 
Therefore, in Hebbel's view, to know what life is one must ask 
wh.at death is,34 for life is only a different death, the birth of 
life and not its end,35 a mask which life assumes.36 Life is the 
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attempt of the recalcitrant individual to free itself from the 
Whole and exist independently, but the attempt can succeed only 
as long as the force lasts which the individual has taken from 
the Whole,37 and therefore the individual must sink back into 
the undifferentiated Whole when this force is exhausted. But 
the individual does not merely sink back, as into repose, but it is 
constantly assailed by the universal forces.38 Diminution in the 
power of an individual form opens an opportunity for other 
forms to attack and replace it: you breathe in another's death 
as your own life and you breath out another's life as your own 
death.39 Small wonder that Hebbel at times felt that the history 
of mankind was like the dream of a beast of prey.40 
Viewed from the perspective of the Absolute, the compact flux 
is life; viewed from the perspective of the individual, the flux is 
neither life nor death, but the two together, a death-life. There 
is only death and there is no death, for even decay is only a 
disintegration of complex life into independent atomistic parts.41 
But, whereas the process may be death-life, the individual must 
die in order for the process to be carried on. Life and death are 
so inextricably intertwined that there is probably not a speck of 
dust on the whole earth that has not at one time been alive, 
iaughing, weeping, blossoming with fragrance,42 and in every 
atom of each of us there is already developing a flower or an 
animal, which can, of course, come to life only through our death; 
immortality of the individual could thus be achieved through the 
utterance of some magic word that would kill these unformed 
lives.43 Although, to be sure, Hebbel calls this last notion fan-
tastic, it none the less fits in consistently with his serious at-
tempts to grapple with first and last things, and with the thought 
we have already quoted (p. 73, above) that the discovery of the 
elixir of life would bring all procreation to a stand-still through 
a petrifaction of the process of death-life. Among the earliest 
entries in his diaries there are several which deal with the pos-
sibility of using the discovery of the elixir of life as the theme 
of a N ovelle: since the discovery would mean that the dead coiuld 
never live again, the situation of a man who discovered it after 
the loss of his beloved would be particularly poignant and suit-
able. 44 This last speculation seems to imply that Hebbel be-
lieved in personal immortality and, indeed, he does seem to have 
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held such a belief, at least, for some time, although he seems also 
not to have been very seriously concerned with this question,45 
and his speculations about it do not follow the clear line that is 
discernible in his feeling about the nature of God and the uni-
verse. 46 For example, he has great hesitation to maintain that 
the individual soul has always been, and feels that only on this 
assumption can the future immortality of the soul be postu-
lated, 47 and seems also to feel that continuation of conscious per-
sonal existence into infinite time is scarcely conceivable, but that 
unending existence without consciousness is quite possible.48 But 
regardless of the mortality or immortality of the individual soul, 
the finite individual is, as we have seen, involved in a never end-
ing process of generation through annihilation. The finest sym-
bol of life is the fly that dies in copulation: its whole existence 
has been merely a preparation for the supreme moment and at 
this moment comes disintegration after the spark of life has 
been passed on to a new creature, and so there is an unending 
chain that constantly leads up to the point of gratification but 
never beyond it.49 Or another symbol is the lizard which snaps 
up a fly and at the same instant is devoured by an adder.50 
From what has just preceded it would seem to be apparent 
that Hebbel's Weltanschauung is not so much an intellectually 
conceived and rationally developed system as it is an immediate 
and intuitional or experiential reaction to life. In the attempt 
to make his Wel"tatnschauung articulate he did undoubtedly use 
terms and concepts that stem from Hegel and Schelling among 
others,51 but this circumstance ought not to obscure the fact that 
the ideas which have been discussed here, for example, those 
which have been called the idea of death-life, or the compact flux, 
were lived by Hebbel and not collected from outside sources. They 
visited him in his dreams and were the projection of an almost 
corporeal Lebensgefuhl. On the sixth of July, 1837, he notes 
this dream in his diary :52 
Last night I dreamt I saw old king Maximilian Joseph buried 
and King Ludwig crowned. Both events took place in the burial 
vault and the funeral rites were dreadfully intermingled with the 
coronation ceremony: the funerary torches did duty in the proces-
sion at the coronation, and when King Ludwig donned the crown 
King Maximilian nodded his head from out of his coffin. I was 
among the coronation officials; when we came up again King 
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Ludwig locked the vault and said, giving me the key: Don't let 
him out, but don't let me in either! 
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At another time53 he writes of having a sense of something 
breathing above him as though it wanted to suck him in and he 
adds that every life is lived at the expense of another. Or again 
he writes :54 
As soon as a man becomes conscious of himself and stands 
erect, he feels something like a pressure from above, and yet he is 
alive only insofar as he is conscious of himself. It is as if he 
were emerging from an abyss and were always being pushed back 
again by an unknown hand. 
As can be expected, this basic sense of life finds expression, 
often very powerful expression, in Hebbel's lyric poetry, as-
suming various guises but never fundamentally changing from 
the earliest years to the latest. 
Hebbel apparently thought his conception of the world as 
containing the individual forms just as the ocean contains the 
drops of water which constitute it so profound and significant 
an idea that it could comfort Elise Lensing for the death of 
their child. 55 While acknowledging ignorance of the ultimate 
cause of the separation of the individual from the matrix of the 
Whole, suggesting that it might be to channel off and break up 
the force of evil or that only through this process could the Deity 
gain self-consciousness, he professes the belief that the indi-
viduals can gain certainty on this point only through death, 
through merging with the Whole like drops of water that roll 
along in the ocean wave. This, of course, is the conception of 
the all-inclusive but differentiated Absolute which has already 
been described (p. 74, above), a world that is so full that it 
would be rigid save for the principle of individuation, by which, 
in constant flow, one being replaces another. The constant flow 
is pictured also in "Requiem,"56 a poem in which the souls of the 
dead are conceived as hovering near the survivors who held 
their memory dear until loving memory fails; then the storm of 
the night seizes them and whirls them away through unending 
desolation where life ceases to be, where there is only a struggle 
of unleashed forces for renewed existence. The thought of dis-
embodied spirits pushing each other, and, by inference, incar-
nate beings also, out of the way in a struggle to gain material 
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existence is a vivid and terrifying one, and one that recurs in 
different guise in a good many poems, as will be seen. But not 
only do the disembodied individuals strive to return to life, but 
the living and finite beings can transcend their limits, at lea.st 
for brief moments, and harbour the spirit of the universe.57 Then 
the individual has a brief glimpse into the dark rifts of the 
Unknown and has a direct intuition of the world. In another 
poem,58 however, in which Hebbel wishes he were able to unwind 
the thread that leads into the center of the cosmic riddle and see 
how the Whole and the One are merged into each other, he ex-
presses the fear that such an attempt, if successful, would anni-
hilate him: just as he has suppressed thoughts which threatened 
his existence, he fears that the Absolute would in self-defense 
suppress an ego that threatened to penetrate too far. None the 
less, it is the right and the nature of the individual to call pain 
and grief down upon itself in its defiance of hostile univers~l 
forces. 09 If it is strong enough in its challenge and defiance the 
gods will refuse nothing except knowledge of the ultimate secret, 
the primeval source of light. This, the individual should seek 
to attain, knowing that the attainment will destroy him and 
merge him with the Infinite. In fact, according to another 
poem,6O the yearning to be merged with the Infinite is the only 
real content of crepuscular earthly existence. 
Thus, the finite and the Infinite, the earthly and the unearthly, 
life and death, are inextricably interwoven in the poet's feelings, 
in his personal sense of death-life. As an instance we may take 
the poem "Geburtsnacht-Traum,"61 which describes a dream in 
wr.ich he saw all his ancestoriS assembled at his side an~ they 
seemed to take a profound interest in him. It was the hour 
which saw his birth and now he must ask himself in trembling 
··whether life and death continue to be intertwined even in the 
grave. This is the same kind of feeling that is expressed in 
"Nachtgeftihl,"62 a poem in which he thinks of the time when ~his 
mother undressed him for the night and of the time when his 
neighbors will undress him for burial; when he goes to sleep he 
often dreams of one time or the other, but cannot be sure which 
is which. A very early expression of the feeling occurs in "Der 
Zauberer,"63 which tells in ballad form an anecdote similar to the 
story of Hartmann von Aue's Der arme Heinrich: In order to 
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save her beloved from death a girl allows a "wise man" to cut 
open her heart to obtain the healing blood which brings her lover 
back from death. But when, upon recovery, the man hears that 
the girl has died, he closes his eyes once more in eternal sleep. 
Although the ending makes the poem an imperfect and deviant 
expression of the theme of interlocking life and death, the sense 
of death-life is central to the anecdote, inasmuch as the life of 
the one is dependent upon the death of the other. In "Die junge 
Mutter,"64 a young woman who has just born a child dies very 
soon after the death of the baby; Hebbel's observation is: the 
angel of death came forth from her womb. The significance, of 
course, lies in the fact that the angel of death came forth from 
the source of life. The death of the mother through the child is 
a special form of a theme that may be called the violent and 
hostile succession of generations, another guise of the sense of 
compact flux. It is connected with the dream already mentioned 
above (p. 78, above) of the intermingling funeral and corona-
tion of the two kings. It occurs in various forms in the poems. 
For example,65 the reigning king walks past the vault where his 
father, whom he dethroned, lies buried. A voice from the vault 
calls out that he has come a whole day too early. Shuddering, 
the king returns to his palace to learn that his son is planning 
to usurp the royal power by force the following day. The king 
then summons his son and invests him with the regalia of king-
ship, hoping thus to redress the balance, for as he says, God has 
promised him to do unto him as he does unto others. Or, in 
another variant,66 the robber captain commands a young recruit 
to commit a murder in order to wean him away from God, saying 
that he had taken the step himself by killing his own father. 
Thereupon the recruit stabs the robber captain to death. An-
other variant67 has a more conciliatory ending. An old man has 
lifted his little grandson up to the straw roof of his son's house 
so that the child could put a candle to it. The son, in a fury, at-
tacks his father and drags him to an abyss into which he wishes 
to hurl him. The old man begs not to be thrown into the depths 
because he himself hurled his own father over the edge at that 
very spot and he is sure that his spirit will never find peace 
there. By this time the little boy has caught up with the two 
men, and the father, seeing him and foreseeing the endless chain 
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of violence that he is about to continue resolves to break it off 
and vows to cherish his father no matter what he may do. 
The notion of compact flux is connected in Hebbel's sense of 
life with a feeling of being threatened by hostile forces on every 
hand, of being pushed out of life. It was a feeling which he 
knew very well from his own home, where there were so many 
mouths to feed and just so much to feed them with. Each mem-
ber of the household could assert itself only at the expense of the 
others: the family dog, which the boy Hebbel loved dearly, had 
to be killed because it required too much to eat. Hebbel's father 
even, according to the diaries,68 resented the appetite of his 
growing sons : 
My father really hated me and we could not love him, either. 
A slave of marriage, bound to poverty with iron fetters, chained 
to bare necessity, and, in spite of the exertion of all his strength 
and of his extreme effort, unable to advance even so much as a 
single step, he hated happiness. The approach to his heart was 
blocked by thistles and thorns, and he could not endure happiness 
in the faces of his own children. Joyous laughter that expands 
the bosom was a grave wrong, mockery directed against him .... 
He called my brother and me his wolves; our appetite took his 
away. We could only rarely eat a slice of bread without having to 
hear that we didn't deserve it. 
The sense of being hemmed in on all sides and of being elbowed 
out of his Lebensraum did not leave him when he entered the 
service of Kirchspielvogt Mohr: there he was cut off by the very 
thin but rigid line of social class from association with people 
whose intellectual stature was comparable to his own, having to 
eat with the menial servants and share a narrow cot with the 
coachman even through an illness of the latter. The sense of 
hostile forces bearing in upon him was something that he ex-
perienced both in mind and body and left a very deep mark upon 
him : it took him very long to overcome the sense of oppression 
in a social gathering, and even when he had gained general 
recognition his long rankling sense of social inferiority found 
such amusing and rather ludicrous expressions as the famous 
calling-cards engraved with the title: Chevalier de plusieurs 
ordres. 
The sense of being pushed out of life finds direct personal 
expression in a number of lyric poems. In "Dammer-Empfind-
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ung"69 he wonders what it is that drives him away from here and 
mysteriously pulls him into some other place; and he speculates 
whether it can be some incorporeal spirit that is crowding him 
into death in order to gain life for itself as his heir, or, whether, 
perhaps, in the beyond the grapes have ripened which are wait-
ing to be plucked by his hand. In "Das Grab"70 he speaks of a 
feeling that impelled him to dig a grave, even though it was 
much against his will to do so, and when he had finished, his 
arms sank to his sides in exhaustion and his only wish was to lie 
down in the grave he had just dug. In another poem71 the uni-
versal hostility of life to life is objectified in a picture which is 
reminiscent of the diary entry which finds a symbol of life in the 
lizard being devoured by an adder as it snaps up a fly (p.78): 
over the desert a vulture hovers searching for prey; below in the 
sand a weary pilgrim plods along; the one is on the point of 
starving to death and the other, on the point of dying of thirst; 
when the two see each other they are eager to meet because each 
longs for the flesh or blood of the other. Another poem72 recalls 
the diary entry which saw in the fly that dies in copulation the 
highest symbol of life (above, p. 78), but in the poem the same 
basic conception is presented as a powerful, terrifying, and 
exultant personal experience. It is a stormy night and the wind 
is ruffling and tearing the leaves from the trees while the poet 
embraces his beloved. His caresses pull a rose-bud out of her 
hair; it falls at her feet and, a goddess of death, she tramples it 
into the dust as her response to his embrace grows more fer-
vent, and the wind carries off the scarf with which she has 
always covered her throat and bosom. At the height of his ardor 
the poet cries out that he and his beloved sense time rushing piast 
with the speed of the wind and dare to surrender to their de-
sires: before him is the allurement of her full and fiery lips, two 
steps behind him, brandishing his scythe, is death. The same 
basic feeling is just as beautifully expressed in one of the early 
poems, "Nachtlied."73 r:I'he poet tells his awe of the surging and 
pulsating night, full of flaming stars in the everlasting reaches 
where some dreadful power has been aroused ; his heart is con-
tracted within his bosom as he feels the colossal stirring of the 
life force in the ebb and flow that threatens to snuff out his own 
life. But then sleep approaches him as the nurse approaches a 
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child and draws the protective magic circle around his feeble 
flickering flame. ' 
The bearing of the immediately foregoing discussion of the 
lyric poems which have been considered upon the question of 
Hebbel's conception of social progress would seem to be rather 
clear. The irregularly rhythmic oscillation of Hebbel's expressed 
beliefs, insights, and convictions between the poles of progres-
sivism and conservatism has been traced in his diaries and let-
ters. A similar oscillation, though one that is necessarily not 
parallel in time to the brief notations of the diaries and letters, 
has been shown to exist in the plays. The opposite poles of 
progressivism and conservatism are so clearly contradictory and 
mutually exclusive that it sometimes seems difficult to under-
stand how so self-conscious a writer as Hebbel could be so incon-
sistent. The present study has revealed that there is good reason 
to believe that this undeniable inconsistency springs from a 
source deep within Hebbel's psychic experience and that the 
fundamental problem is not so well expressed in terms of social 
and historical progress as it is in terms of a metaphysical con-
ception of a universal compact flux through a process of death-
life. The notion of the compact flux can· be taken as a necessary 
consequence of the dualism, Absolute and Individual, Whole and 
Part: The Whole breaks up into a myriad transient forms. If 
it is the Whole which breaks up, there is no space between these 
forms, but only U:ne. Therefore a form can exist only in a space 
which once was occupied by another form. Therefore the num-
ber of simultaneous individuals is always at a maximum and the 
only movement that takes place must be a movement of succes-
sion, not necessarily to a higher level of existence, though that 
may be the case in specific instances, but always to a stage of 
renewed dynamic equilibrium. There is only one supreme law: 
that the Whole be maintained; the individual is of no conse-
quence; if the existence of the individual form upsets the equili-
brium it must be punished, that is, eliminated; but there is no 
reason whatever why it should be compensated for any misfor-
tune that befalls it. 
The sense of life which has just been summarized in terms 
that seek to convey on the level of conceptual understanding 
what really does not belong on this level at all, is, one can say 
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with some assurance, a primal experience, personal, religio-
poetic, even almost corporeal in its immediacy. Its nature is 
mystical, not syllogistic or dialectic. It is almost ineffable, under-
going a multitude of only nearly and almost wholly articulate 
formulations in the diaries and letters, and in the plays and 
poems. There is no rigid consistency of formulation, there can-
not be, since what is formulated is a psychic state, not a logical 
conclusion.74 Fundamentally, Hebbel's plays are not the alle-
gorical garments of a philosophy of history, but moving images 
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20 Tgb., II, 26-27, # 1958, 3 April 1840. 
21 Tgb., II, 26, # 1958, 3 April 1840. 
91 
22 Genoveva, begun 13 Sept. 1840, completed 1 March 1841. Cf. Tgb., 
II, 102, # 2304, 13 March 1841, where Hebbel writes that Jud1#1,; bears 
the same relation to Genoveva as the negative pole to the positive. 
23 Tgb., I, 322-323, # 1475, 2 Fehr. 1839. 
24 Nachspiel zur Genoveva, completed 21 Jan. 1851. 
25 For the term cf. K. Ziegler, Mensch wnd Welt in der Tragodie Heb-
belB (Berlin, 1938). 
26 LI. 508-511. 
27 LI. 470-471. 
28 Ll. 785-786. 
29 Ll. 1446-1451. 
30 Tgb., II, 99, # 2290, 12 March 1841. 
31 Tgb., I, 319-321, # 1475, 2 Fehr. 1839. 
32 Ll. 1562-1656. 
33 Tgb., I, 321, # 1475, 2 Febr. 1839. 
34 Tgb., I, 322, # 1475, 2 Febr. 1839. 
35 Ll. 722-724. 
36 Tgb., II, 111, # 2337, 29 May 1841. 
37 Tgb., I, 322, # 1475, 2 Febr. 1839. 
38 Cf. Tgb., II, 112, # 2342, 30 May 1841; 147, # 2464, 10 Fehr. 1842; 150, 
# 2472, 14 Fehr. 1842. 
39 Cf. Paul G. Graham, The Relation of History to Drwma in the Works 
of Friedrick Hebbel (Smith College Studies in Modern Languages, 
XV, Nos. 1-2, October 1933-January 1934), p. 26. 
40 Ll. 2880-2897. 
41 Tgb., II, 146, # 2460, 31 Jan. 1842. 
42 The supposition that this entry is to be take.n rather seriously is 
given some support by the consideration that in the play Siegfried, 
on his way home to the Palatinate, is detained by illness in the inter-
mediate city of Strassburg. 
43 Begun in February 1838; completed 29 November 1841. 
44 Begun 10 March 1843, completed 4 December 1843. 
46 Cf. Tgb., II, 324-325, # 2910, 4 Dec. 1843. 
46 Br., II, 348, # 171. 
47 For a discussion of the lower middle class attitude toward pre-marital 
relations of betrothed couples see Werner's introduction to the play, 
Wke., II, xviii-xix. 
48 Act III, vii, 62. 
49 Act I, v, 28-29. 
50 Act II, i, 40. 
51 Act II, v, 41. 
52 Act II, v, 51. 
53 Act I, iv, 18-19. 
54 Act II, vi, 52. 
55 Act III, viii, 63. 
56 Act I, iii, 15; v, 23-24; vii, 34. 
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57 Begun November 1845, completed 23 October 1847. 
58 Tgb., III, 187, # 3943, 30 Jan. 1847. 
59 Tgb., III, 187, # 3943, 30 Jan. 1847. 
60 Begun 12 September 1846, completed 9 January 1847. 
61 Tgb., III, 187, # 3943, 30 Jan. 1847. 
62 Wke., II, 379-380. 
62a Cf. Tgb., II, 239, # 2664, 6 March 1843; 295, # 2845, 11 Nov. 1843; 
269, # 2776, 29 Aug. 1843. 
63 Begun 23 February 1847, completed 14 November 1848. 
64 Tgb., II 328-329, # 2926, 8 Dec. 1843. 
65 Br., IV, 129, # 277, 14 Aug. 1848. 
66 Br., IV, 74, # 256, 22 Dec. 1847. 
67 Wke., XI, 253, Hebbel's review of Massenger's Ludovico. 
68 LI. 801-819. 
69 LI. 148-156, 775-783. 
70 LI. 2283-2325. 
71 LI. 2775-2790. 
72 LI. 79-95. 
73 LI. 836-843. 
74 LI. 1012-1039. 
75 Cf. Benno von Wiese, Die deutsche Tragodie von Lessing bis Hebbel, 
(Hamburg, 1948), II, 418ff. 
76 LI. 1830-1832. 
77 L. 1901. 
78 LI. 1906-1910. 
79 Loe. cit. and ll. 1803-1807. 
80 LI. 1646-1647. 
81 LI. 1778-1780. 
82 LI. 1833-1845. 
83 LI. 2187-2194. 
84 LI. 2201-2205. 
85 Can one individual sin against another? Hebbel says no. The prin-
ciple which can be sinned against is something which transcends indi-
viduals as su,ch. Not even the worst sophist, he says, will dare to 
identify with an individual the principle which can be sinned against 
by another individual and then deny that, these individuals, being 
considered as members of a cosmic moral order, as monads in which 
the highest Idea seeks mysteriously to manifest itself, are justi-
fied in proportion to their power. Cf. Wke., XI, 27. 
86 Cf. H. T. Rotscher's introductory remarks in Jahrbiicher fii,r dra-
matsche Kunst und Literatur (1849) as quoted in Werner's edition 
of Hebbel Wke., II, 414-415. Werner quite correctly observes that 
Rotscher must have based his remarks on letters from Hebbel, of 
whose style and language the passage is so reminiscent. 
87 LI. 3037-3042. 
88 Cf. Br., VI, 55-56, # 412, 15 Sept. 1852, to Arnold Runge. 
89 Begun 1 April 1849, completed 19 May 1849. 
90 Tgb., I, 82, # 442, October or November 1836. 
91 LI. 1033-1057. 
92 Ll. 1305-1318. 
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93 Composition begun 1845, first act completed 12 June 1849, second act 
completed 25 October 1850. 
94 Cf. Br., VIII, 45-46, # 922, 9 August 1852, to Saint Rene TaiIIandier. 
95 Cf. Tgb., III, 185, # 3943, 30 Jan. 1847. 
96 Begun 22 Sept. 1851, completed 24 Dec. 1851. 
97 Cf. Act IV, iv, 202, II. 12-14; Act V, iv, 219, II. 11-12. 
98 Tgb., III, 413, # 4982, 24 Dec. 1851. 
99 Br., IV, 350, # 322, 26 Jan. 1852. 
100 Br., V, 205, # 485, 14 Dec. 1854. 
101 Tgb., III, 406, # 4941, 30 Sept. 1851. 
102 Tgb., III, 2-3, # 3286, January 1845. 
103 Br., VII, 291, # 841, 27 Jan. 1863. 
104 Hebbels Agnes Bernauer (Weimar 1931). 
105 Ibid., pp. 30, 72. 
106 Die deutsche Tragodie vm Lessing bis Hebbel, II, 430ff. 
107 "Die Doppelstellung Herzog Albrechts in Hebbels Agnes Bernauer," 
MFDU, XXXI, 209ff. 
108 Act II, xvii, 154. 
1'09 Tgb., III, 384, # 4848, 11 March 1851: "Auch das Weltgericht hat 
Pau,sen." 
110 Act IV, iv, 202. 
111 Act IV, iii, 200. 
112 Act V, vi, 224. 
l.13 Br., V, 97, # 431, 10 Febr. 1853, to Adolf Pichler. 
114 Act V, vi, 225. 
115 Act V, x, 233. 
116 Begun Dec. 1853, completed 14 November 1854. 
117 Br., VI, 74, # 582a, 10 Nov. 1857, to Georg Cotta. 
118 Br., V, 203-204, # 485, 14 Dec. 1854. 
119 Cf. the introductory distichs to the effect that the mythical apparatus 
is intended to give an atmosphere to the play, not to symbolize fate, 
which comes only from the human breast; also a letter to Sigmund 
Englander (Br., VII, 304, # 847, 23 Fehr. 1863) in which he repeats 
the belief that the ring is not essential to the play. 
120 Br., V, 203-204, # 485, 14 Dec. 1854, to Friedrich Uechtritz. 
121 Br., V, 306, # 535, 16 May 1856, to Karl Werner. 
122 Br., V, 204, # 485, 14 Dec. 1854, to Friedrich Uechtritz. 
123 LI. 962-964. 
124 LI. 329-341. 
125 LI. 1205-1206. 
126 L. 991. 
127 LI. 1224-1228. 
128 Ll. 1268-1273. 
129 LI. 987-993. 
130 Ll. 347-349. 
131 LI. 906-941, esp. 936-941. 
94 HEBBEL'S CONCEPTION OF MOVEMENT 
132 LI. 942-945. 
133 LI. 1205-1206. 
134 LI. 1517-1518. 
135 L. 1572. 
136 LI. 1584-1586. 
137 LI. 1963-1964. 
138 LI. 1947-1953. 
139 Cf. p. 28, above. 
140 LI. 1801-1802, 1822-1825. 
141 LI. 1848-1850. 
142 LI. 13-15. 
143 LI. 76-80. 
144 LI. 61-69. 
145 L. 282. 
146 LI. 991-993. 
147 LI. 431-440. 
148 LI. 1074-1078. 
149 Cf. p. 55 above, also Pio Eggst.ein, Friedrick Hebbels Dratm.a. G11ges 
und seiri Ring (Dissertation, University of Zurich, 1948), pp. 11-12, 
who points out that the play must not be viewed exclusively from the 
historical perspective. 
150 LI. 1718-1722. 
J.51 LI. 448-449. 
152 LI. 1928-1932. 
153 LI. 358-397 and 554-561. 
154 LI. 1849-1850. 
155 Cf. Tgb., III, 55, # 3475, 3 July 1845: "Man and woman in their un-
disguised relation to one another: the former destroyed by the latter.'' 
Cf. also Elise Dosenheimer, Das zentrale Problem in der Tragiidie 
Hebbels (Halle, 1925). 
156 LI. 1778-1800. 
157 LI. 1809-1812. 
158 LI. 1806-1807. 
159 LI. 1827-1830. 
160 LI. 1443-1445. 
161 LI. 48 and 86. 
162 Ll. 258-273. 
163 LI. 534-537. 
164 LI. 622-624. 
165 LI. 660-667. 
166 L. 458. 
167 L. 561. 
168 LI. 1925-1927. 
169 L. 1361. 
170 LI. 501-510. 
171 LI. 1418-1424. 
172 LI. 1492-1494. 
173 Begun Oct. 1855, completed 22 March 18C0. 
NOTES 
174 Br., VI, 193, # 626, 24 Aug. 1858. 
175 Br., VII, 12, # 702, 21 Jan. 1861. 
176 Cf. Wke., IV, "Lesarten und Anmerkungen," 369-373. 
177 LI. 1062-1069. 
178 LI. 2689-2691. 
179 LI. 100-105. 
180 LI. 2689-2691. 
181 LI. 4479-4490. 
182 LI. 171-179, 568. 
183 LI. 537-650. 
184 LI. 642-650. 
185 LI. 1735-1736, 1737, 1905-1907. 
186 LI. 1752-1754, 1761--1 768. 
187 LI. 3915-3975. 
95 
188 Begun Dec. 1857, composition continued until the end of Hebbel's life. 
189 Br., VI, 244, # 646, 24 March 1859. 
190 Tgb., I, 228, # 1047. 
191 Tgb., II, 88, # 2231. 
192 Tgb., III, 333-334, # 4566. 
193 Oskar Walzel in his book Friedrick Hebbel und seine Dramen (Leip-
zig, Berlin, 1927), pp. 134-137, quite rightly insists that the play is 
a fragment, but he would seem to be pushing caution a bit too far by 
insisting that such a relatively complete fragment and one which, 
especially in the masterly third and fourth acts, particularly the 
"revelation" scenes eight, nine, and ten of the fourth act, shows no 
slackening of Hebbel's creative force, perhaps even the contrary, 
does not reveal enough of the writer's intention to be significant. 
Walzel finds it hard to accept Demetrius because it is so different 
from all the preceding plays as Walzel interprets them. It is quite 
true, Walzel's "Wendepunkt" theory is inadequate to account for 
Demetrius. A pertinent question is: Should not, in view of this fact, 
the theory be reexamined in its application to the earlier plays, not-
ably Geno'IJ61}a, Agnes Bernauer, and Gyges und sein Ring, and, if 
found inadequate there, too, as it seems to be, discarded? 
194 Cf., for example, Br., VI, 207, 216, 224-226. 
195 Hebbel's spelling of the names will be retained, although they are in 
many instances arbitrary and incorrect. 
196 L. 385. 
197 L. 593. 
198 LI. 1695-1698. 
199 LI. 1275-1295. 
200 LI. 414-419. 
201 LI. 755-784. 
202 LI. 1575-1608. 
203 LI. 3024-3026. 
204 LI. 930-937. 
205 LI. 920-929. 
206 LI. 944-950. 
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207 LI. 930-1004. 
208 LI. 962-972. 
209 LI. 2220-2224. But see Benno von Wiese, Die deutsche Tragodie von 
Lessing bis Hebbel, II, 458. 
210 LI. 3055-3074. 
PART THREE 
1 Tgb., I, 294, # 1364, 28 Nov. 1838. 
2 Tgb., IV, 277, # 6102, 8 March 1863. 
3 Tgb., I, 338, # 1515, 24 Fehr. 1839. 
4 Tgb., I, 306, # 1418, 6 Jan. 1839. 
5 Tgb., II, 407, # 3144, 31 May 1844. 
6 Tgb., III, 44, # 3403, 21 Fehr. 1845. 
7 Tgb., IV, 112, # 5578, 20 March 1857. 
8 Tgb., II, 79, # 2197, 2 Dec. 1840. 
9 Tgb., I, 348, # 1546, 8 April 1839. 
10 Tgb., II, 26, # 1958, 3 April 1840. 
11 Tgb., III, 54, # 3466, 20 April 1845. 
12 Tgb., IV, 232, # 6001, 26 Nov. 1862. 
13 Tgb., II, 110, # 2329, 29 April 1841. 
14 Tgb., II, 5, # 1883, 3 Jan. 1840. 
15 Tgb., II, 270, # 2784, 20 Sept. 1843. 
16 Tgb., I, 18, # 77. 
17 Tgb., II, 174, # 2531, 18 April 1842. 
18 Tgb., II, 265, # 2759, 19 Aug. 1843. 
19 Tgb., II, 256, # 2731, 12 July 1843. 
20 Tgb., II, 239, # 2663, 6 March 1843. 
21 Tgb., III, 210, # 4019a, 10 March 1847. 
22 Wke., VI, 376. 
23 Tgb., III, 112, # 3736, 3 Oct. 1846. 
24 Tgb., I, 391, # 1744, 28 Oct. 1839. 
25 Tgb., I, 377, # 1687, 8 Oct. 1839. 
26 Tgb., II, 377, # 3028, 31 Jan. 1844. 
27 Tgb., II, 100, # 2302, 12 March 1841. 
28 Tgb., II, 33, # 1971, 6 April 1840. 
29 Tgb., II, 67, # 2137, 25 Sept. 1840. 
30 Tgb., III, 112, # 3739, 3 Oct. 1846. 
31 Tgb., II, 117, # 2359, 1 July 1841. 
32 Tgb., IV, 77, # 5847, 21 Jan. 1861. 
33 Wolfgang Liepe in his article, "Der Schlussel zum W eltbild Hebbels: 
Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert," MFDU, XLIII (March 1951), writes 
that he feels he has discovered the all-important source of Hebbel's 
view of life in the writings of Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert. His very 
interesting essay points out curious parallels that are very sugges-
tive, indeed. Presumably, he will in a more comprehensive and pre-
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cise study give definite and documented proof that Hebbel had read 
the works in question. As Professor Liepe himself maintains, the 
significance of his thesis is not to demonstrate that Hebbel "lifted" 
his basic philosophy from any specific sources, but to illuminate the 
growth-process of his mind. If positive proof of this is established, 
it will surely be very illuminating for the force with which Hebbel 
experienced things and which, apparently, allowed him to assimilate 
another's thoughts and feelings with the same intensity as he as-
similated his own life-experiences. 
It must be pointed out, however, that in precisely the most im-
portant point of comparison Hebbel and Schubert take exactly oppo-
site positions. As we have seen, in Hebbel's view the individual forms 
are indispensable to the Absolute, which, but for them must terminate 
in static rigidity. As Liepe points out (pp. 121, 123, and passim), in 
Schubert's view the vital flow of original nature has been transformed 
into a static co-existence of individual stereotypic forms. Hebbel'.'> 
view surely contradicts Schubert's: can it be dependent upon it? 
34 Tgb., I, 90, # 501, 15 Dec. 1836. 
35 Tgb., I, 87, # 476, 10 Dec. 1836. 
36 Tgb., III, 245, # 4214, 20 June 1847. 
37 Tgb., II, 95, # 2262, 2 Fehr. 1841. 
38 Tgb., II, 138, # 2440, 14 Jan., 1842. 
39 Tgb., IV, 112, # 5578, 20 March 1857. 
40 Tgb., IV, 131, # 5659, 25 March 1859. 
41 Tgb., II, 286, # 2823, 6 Nov. 1843. 
42 Tgb., II, 373, # 3012, 27 Jan. 1844. 
43 Tgb., III, 44, # 3401, 21 Fehr. 1845. 
44 Tgb., I, 6, # 14-16, 1 April 1835. 
45 Tgb., III, # 3317, 16 Fehr. 1845. 
46 Cf. the following diary entries: # 32, 33, 2596, 4453, 4837, 4850, 5166, 
5583, 5662. 
47 Tgb., II, 192, # 2576, 29 July 1842. 
48 Tgb., II, 326, # 2920, 6 Dec. 1843. 
49 Tgb., II, 178, # 2550, 13 May 1842. 
50 Tgb., IV, 135, # 5688, 1 April 1859. 
51 Cf. Wilhelm Waetzoldt, Hebbel und die Philosophie seiner Zeit (Ber-
lin, 1903) ; Ludwig Marcuse, "Der Hegelianer Friedrich Hebbel gegen 
Hegel," MFDU, XXIX, pp. 506-514; also H. M. Wolff, "Noch. einmal 
Hebbel und Hegel," MFDU, XL, pp. 157-159; and Wolfgang Liepe, 
"Der Schlussel zum Weltbild Hebbels: Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert," 
MFDU, XLIII, pp. 117-132. 
52 Tgb., I, 171, # 773. 
53 Tgb., II, 101, # 2303, 12 March 1841. 
54 Tgb., II, 57, # 2078, 13 August 1840. 
55 "Das a:bgeschiedene Kind an seine Mutter," Wke., VI, 294, 17 Dec. 
1843. 
56 Wke., VI, 149, 15 August 1840. 
57 "Erleuchtung," Wke., VI, 255, 1836. 
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58 "Mysterium," Wke., VI, 322, spring 1842. 
59 "Dem Schmerz sein Recht," Wke., VI, 293, 21 Sept. 1841. 
60 "Reminiszenz," Wke., VI, 258, 29 Jan. 1843. 
61 Wke., VI, 255, 22 March 1835. 
62 Wke., VI, 227, 31 May 1836. 
63 Wke., VII, 51, 28 July 1831. 
64 Wke., VI, 179, 4 April 1841. 
65 "Yater und Sohn," Wke., VII, 152, 31.0ct.1837. 
66 "Vater Unser," Wke., VI, 169, 5 Dec. 1839. 
67 "Yater und Sohn," (sic), Wke., VI, 427, Oct. 1862. 
68 Tgb., I, 279-280, # 1323, Nov., 1838. 
69 Wke., VI, 258, 2 Fehr. 1843. 
70 Wke., VI, 263, 24 Fehr. 1837. 
71 "Wiistenbild," Wke., VI, 328, 1851. 
72 "Sturmabend," Wke., VI, 143, 19 May 1841. 
73 Wke., VI, 143, 6 May 1836. 
74 Cf. T. M. Campbell, The Life and Works of Friedrich Hebbel (Bos-
ton, 1919), p. 110. 
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